What does Reid mean by ‘common sense’?

Section 1 explains what Reid means by ‘common sense’ and ‘the principles of common sense.’ Section 2 distinguishes between two kinds of priority that Reid supposes the principles of common sense to have. Section 3 considers Reid’s views regarding the sources of epistemological and methodological priority; i.e. why Reid thinks that first principles have the kinds of priority that they do. Section 4 uses the results of previous sections to answer Reid’s critics. Section 5 addresses a more general issue. Davidson (1992) and Rorty (1979) (among others) have leveled a now familiar objection to foundationalism; that we are trapped in ‘the circle of belief,’ and therefore cannot hope to ground knowledge or justification elsewhere. I argue that a distinction between epistemological and methodological priority allows us to dissolve this objection as well.