ABSTRACT
With these points in mind, we can see that Kant’s complaints about Reid are off the mark. Here is what Kant writes:
To appeal to common sense, when insight and science fail, and no sooner – this is one of the subtle discoveries of modern times, by means of which the most superficial ranter can safely enter the lists with the most thorough thinker, and hold his own. But as long as a particle of insight remains, no one would think of having recourse to this subterfuge. For what is it but an appeal to the opinion of the multitude, of whose applause the philosopher is ashamed, while the popular charlatan glories and confides in it? (Kant 1902, 7) First, it is clear that Reid’s appeal to common sense is not an appeal to the
multitude. In fact, we have seen that, for Reid, the authority of common sense, whether epistemological or methodological, is not owed to its being common, or something shared by the multitude, at all.
