ABSTRACT
This conspectus of ‘modern’ moral epistemology (seventeenth and nineteenth ce) shows how much of the contemporary agenda in moral epistemology was set then, and how in some important regards unlikely philosophical allies—Hobbes, Hume, Rousseau, Kant and Hegel—made greater contributions than are familiar today. Sophisticated versions of many genres of moral philosophy were developed: natural law morality, commonsense morality, rationalist teleological theories (perfectionism), moral sentiment theories, moral consensus theories, utilitarianism, social contract theories, conservatism, varieties of moral constructivism, and a neglected species which may be called “natural law constructivism.” The period is pervaded by concern with the Pyrrhonian dilemma of the criterion, which highlights crippling difficulties inherent in foundationalism, coherentism, self-evidence and dogmatism. Natural law constructivism shows that strictly objective basic moral principles can be identified and justified rigorously, without appeal to moral realism (pro or contra) and without appeal to moral motivation or to sentiments.
