ABSTRACT
In 1980, Rawls contrasted “Kantian constructivism” with Sidgwick’s “rational intuitionism.” In doing so, he suggested a way of thinking of the history—as a battle between constructivism and intuitionism—and inspired those who followed him, such as Street, to develop the constructivist case. I start with Sidgwick’s intuitionism—shared by Rashdall, Moore, Ross, Prichard, Carritt, Broad, and Ewing. I then consider two objections: the worry that peer disagreement should reduce him (and intuitionists in general) to skepticism, and the Rawlsian worry that Sidgwick’s view makes us “heteronomous,” and so we should adopt Kantian constructivism. I close by considering the claim, pressed by Sharon Street, that only constructivism can avoid a skepticism based on the explanation of our moral beliefs.
