ABSTRACT
Understanding interdependency and bridging Since the signing of the 1951 Treaty of Paris and the launch of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952, the Nordic countries have been confronted by the most sophisticated example of attempts at managing European interdependence – namely the ongoing evolution of the ‘European integration project’. European integration now has a more than 60-year track record of relatively successful development marked, via the 1957 Treaty of Rome, by the creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), and since then by the flagship treaties of the Single European Act (1986) – Maastricht (1992), Amsterdam (1997), Nice (2001) and Lisbon (2007) – which have given birth to the European Union (EU). At the same time, it has been commonplace among political elites and even the general populations in these states to engage in debates on variations of ‘Nordic exceptionalism’ (Lawler 1997). Nordic debates have often echoed with assertions that ‘Nordic and Nordic branding is better’ (Browning 2007), not least in terms of political development and economic well-being. As several of the authors in this volume note, these debates have often been concerned with the prospect that closer relations with ‘Europe’ – be they via overarching arrangements such as the European Economic Area (EEA) for Iceland and Norway or full membership status (for Denmark since 1973, Finland and Sweden since 1995) – may impinge on and undermine particular forms of welfare capitalism, generous Nordic welfare state provision and even varieties of so-called Nordic models (Hilson 2008; Miles 1995, 1996). In addition, there have been recurrent debates surrounding Nordic identity (Hansen and Wæver 2002; Browning 2007) and whether to regard the Nordic region as being somewhat different from the continent, fuelling, at least in theory, the aforementioned specific narratives whereby the Nordic countries had the freedom to develop concepts of a Nordic model grounded in strong commitments to national sovereignty, a once-socialdemocratic-inspired version of ‘welfare capitalism’ and particular forms of Nordic internationalism (cf. Esping-Andersen 1990). Nevertheless, Nordic governments and political elites have been quick to recognise simultaneously that such interdependence bestows vital connectivity that must be carefully managed. In this respect, securing access for international trade has been an overriding and consistent imperative. After all, all five Nordic states remain open, globalised, export-oriented economies, the EU representing their largest trading partner, and international trade provides vital economic revenues that are essential to maintaining their version of ‘welfare capitalism’ and supporting generous welfare state programmes. In addition, since the nineteenth century, free trade and competition have been closely coupled with solidaristic values in the development of Nordic societies (Grøn et al. 2015; Schouenborg 2013). Among the five Nordic states, there has then been a relatively similar and remarkably universal acknowledgement of their (growing) interdependence with the rest of Europe built around the Single European Market (SEM, or ‘Internal Market’, as it is termed in the chapter on this issue in this volume), the European
Economic Area and the evolving single currency. Indeed, all of the cases have been marked by some kind of comprehensive recognition among the respective Nordic political elites that this interdependence must be ‘bridged’. Hence Nordic attitudes towards European integration have been shaped by a number of overlapping interdependencies of which, over time, the interdependence with the EU has become ever more predominant. For this chapter, ‘interdependence’ is taken to mean the existence of often complex (and usually reciprocal) relationships between multiple entities or units wherein the influence and behaviour of the respective entities/units have a major impact or bearing on the existence and well-being of the others in the relationship. Baldwin (1992), for instance, argued that there were two major economic poles in post-war Western Europe which had a disproportionate influence on the economic policies of the surrounding states. The first pole was the UK. In the Nordic case, the UK was a major consideration affecting Nordic policies towards European integration for most of the post-war period, given that the UK constituted a major market for Nordic goods, Nordic agricultural products in particular. UK-Nordic interdependence was therefore very high and, certainly up until the 1970s, Nordic policies towards European integration were influenced by the need to shadow British perspectives and policies. Hence, like the UK, the Nordic countries chose to not participate actively in the original negotiations leading to the ECSC (operational in 1952) nor later in the Messina Conference, which opened the doors to the EEC and EURATOM in 1957 (operational in 1958). Equally, when the UK chose to apply and subsequently re-activate EEC membership applications in 1961, 1964 and 1967, Denmark and Norway both also felt it necessary to submit their own entry applications. The second pole was Germany. From the 1970s and the ever-growing influence of the Deutschmark zone and then with renewed emphasis after reunification in 1990, Nordic interdependence steadily increased parallel to a German-driven European Community (EC) (Barnes 1996). In effect, the EC became the major economic partner of the Nordic countries and access to the EC customs union (later the Common Market) became a key policy priority for all of them. It should not be forgotten that there is also a high degree of political and economic interdependence among the five Nordic countries – not merely in terms of international trade between them but also in terms of the key Nordic frameworks, such as the Nordic Passport Union and Common Nordic Labour Market, which have removed barriers to free movement and trade, thereby establishing a high degree of interdependence between the Nordic countries (Nedergaard 2009). Granting consideration to one another’s positions in relation to the emerging EC/EU has also been a central Nordic concern when approaching European integration. Hence the Nordic governments have often been supportive of wider frameworks, such as the establishment of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in 1960 after the 1959 Stockholm Convention and the later European Economic Area (operational in 1993) as a means to ensure common Nordic approaches towards European integration and EC/EU agendas. Similarly, once
Denmark (in 1973) and Finland and Sweden (1995) acceded to the EC/EU, the other Nordic countries outside the EC/EU sought to formalise their relationship. These three interlocking circles of interdependence have therefore ensured that the Nordic countries have been interested not just in bridging relations between themselves and the rest of the continent but also in using these frameworks to reinforce the existing bridges between the Nordic states and within the Nordic region. It is appropriate at this point also to introduce the notion of ‘bridging’. In the context of this chapter, ‘bridging’ can be loosely defined as the (formal and informal) behaviour, activities and outcomes of (usually) political elites that seek to manage the influence and impacts of the aforementioned kinds of interdependence on their respective unit(s), state(s) or institution(s), thereby possibly enhancing and/or managing their own influence on other respective interdependent unit(s), state(s) or institution(s) engaged in the reciprocal, connective relationship. It might also be pertinent here to use the imagery of the now famous and highly successful Öresund road-rail physical transport link connecting Denmark and Sweden over the Öresund Strait since its opening in 2000. This connection brings together one of the Nordic region’s most important cosmopolitan areas, stretching in the west from Copenhagen, the Danish capital, to Malmö, Sweden’s third largest city, in the east. In many ways, the Öresund link can be viewed as a physical symbol of successful Nordic cooperation. In this context, however, and just like the physical 8-km Öresund Bridge connecting Sweden to the artificial island of Peberholm, Nordic governments have sought to build formal bridges to manage this interdependence with Europe via official, clearly seen arrangements intended to formalise Nordic access to EC/ EU markets and ensure that Nordic economic activity was not compromised by any future potential development of a ‘Fortress Europe’. This has remained a consistent feature of Nordic relations with the EU over the last decades. For three of the Nordic states – Denmark in 1973, Finland and Sweden in 1995 – this formalisation has culminated in full EC/EU membership, meaning that most of the Nordic states are now within the borders of the EU. Iceland and Norway have preferred and continue to prefer a form of ‘near-outsidership’ (Miles 2010a) centring around – on one level – formal participation in the EEA and membership of the Schengen Area since the 1990s. The reality, then, is that the combination of EEA and EU membership arrangements have ensured the extension of all (in the cases of Denmark, Finland and Sweden) and/or the majority (for Iceland and Norway) of SEM rules and the (nearly all) four freedoms1 across the entire Nordic region. For the most part, the Nordic region is integrated into the Single European Market, illustrating how interdependence has led to common formal platforms of cooperation that span the Nordic region. These aspects often form the basis for assertions of a common Nordic view concerning the benefits of European integration, although there have been rather vigorous recent debates in some of the Nordic countries about the extent of participation in the free movement of persons.
