ABSTRACT
Introduction From the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) by the Treaty of Paris in 1951, through the creation of the EEC by the Treaty of Rome in 1957 and the signing of the Treaty on the European Union in 1992, to the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 and the subsequent struggles over its interpretation and implementation, the European integration project has presented the Nordic states with both challenges and opportunities. The EU presents the Nordic states with a set of opportunities and benefits, but the Nordic countries are at the same time ambitious and vulnerable. The EU delimits the action space of the great powers by subjecting all member states to the same set of formal rules and sanctions should they break the rules (Steinmetz and Wivel 2010).1 It also provides shelter against open protectionism, external discrimination against exports, financial turmoil, political unrest and a number of soft security threats (Bailes and Thorhallsson 2013), thereby effectively transforming the fundamental challenge facing most of Europe’s small states from an existential ‘survival problem’ to a less acute, but still important, ‘influence problem’ (Løvold 2004). This is particularly beneficial for the Nordic states, which have proven themselves to be among the most effective and competent in coordinating policy positions domestically, providing instructions for negotiators and forging informal alliances with states and other actors in order to pursue their interests within the heavily institutionalised decision-making environment of the EU (e.g. Arter 2000; Bjørkdahl 2008; Jakobsen 2009; Panke 2010). On the other hand, EU integration presents its member states with a dilemma between autonomy and influence, which intensifies with deepened integration (Goetschel 1998; Kelstrup 1993, 2014; Miles and Wivel 2014; Mouritzen and Wivel 2005a). The stronger the institutions, the greater the potential costs and benefits of participating and the more intense this integration dilemma becomes. Costs and benefits are likely to arise continuously as the institutionalisation process becomes ever more binding and encompasses an increasing number of areas. A state facing this dilemma must strike a balance between surrendering and maintaining autonomy; the former involves risks of entrapment in a process leading to more dependency as institutions are strengthened, whereas the latter
involves risks of abandonment, where they forgo the chance to influence other states and other gains resulting from institutionalisation. This dilemma is particularly intense for small states, because ‘[t]hey are stuck with the power configuration and its institutional expression, no matter what their specific relation to it is’ (Mouritzen and Wivel 2005b: 4). For the Nordic states the integration dilemma plays an even greater role than for small states in general, because they are political-activist and internationally ambitious states, seeking to influence agendas in European and international affairs while at the same time safeguarding their own distinctiveness, typically summed up in concepts such as the ‘Nordic model’ or the ‘Scandinavian welfare state’. Christine Ingebritsen (2002: 21) thus ‘defines Scandinavia as a group of states with a distinct role in international society [which] consistently provides standards – from models of global environmental management and alternative means of conflict resolution to models of global giving’, and Peter Lawler (1997: 567) finds that ‘there is inscribed upon the collective identities of the Scandinavian states decades of innovative domestic reformism and multifaceted internationalism’. Schouenborg (2013) goes even further, claiming that commitment to the welfare state is a necessary condition for legitimate membership of a socalled ‘Scandinavian international society’ and the basis of that which we have come to regard as exceptionalist Nordic internationalism characterised by democratically accountable foreign policies, free trade, common social rights within the Nordic region and a strong commitment to multilateral conflict resolution.2 Nordic exceptionalism has developed into a ‘brand’ (Browning 2007) whereby ‘Norden’ is depicted as not only distinct from but also better than Europeanisation (Wæver 1992). Thus, not unlike the main character in Frank Capra’s classic political comedy-drama Mr. Smith Goes to Washington, where the highly decent but somewhat naïve Mr. Smith takes a seat in the US Congress and finds himself surrounded by politicking crooks, we would perhaps believe the idealist proponents of the Nordic model to be in for an unpleasant surprise when encountering the bureaucratised power politics of Brussels – and to react accordingly. This is not the case. As the chapters in this volume demonstrate, the Nordic states have pursued their opportunities in the European integration process with pragmatic functionalism while simultaneously guarding their exceptionalism and distinctiveness. The remaining part of this chapter discusses this Nordic ‘yes, but . . .’ approach to European integration and what it means for the future of the Nordic countries in the European integration process. We structure the discussion in three steps. First, we return to the starting point of this volume and discuss the extent to which the Nordic states represent a different or even an alternative model and/or alternative community to the EU and Europe. Is there still a case for Nordic distinctiveness and exceptionalism in the EU context? How and to what extent was there ever a case for talking about a particular Nordic model as an alternative or supplement to the EU? Second, using our theoretical starting point in institutionalism (unpacked in Chapter 1), we discuss the applicability and success of this framework while illuminating the choices
and policies of the Nordic countries with respect to EU integration. Finally, we discuss the future prospects of the Nordic countries in the EU.
