ABSTRACT
This chapter contextualizes the Japanese invasion of the Philippines within the wider matrix of the opening phase of the Pacific War. The first section discusses the Japanese and Allied planning regarding the Philippine Campaign. The second section focuses on the invasion of the Philippines by the Japanese forces and the last section turns the limelight on the endgame at Bataan and Corregidor. Surprise, better aircraft and better pilots along with MacArthur’s passive command made the Japanese counter-air strike at the beginning of the Philippine invasion a complete success. And establishment of Japanese aerial superiority on 8 December 1941 made landing of their ground troops possible. MacArthur’s principal mistake was to replace Plan ORANGE (defending only Manila Bay), with his plan to defend the whole of the Philippines. Initially, he decided to meet the invasion on the beaches. Later, he changed track and decided to pull his troops back into the interior of the Philippine archipelago. This resulted in confusion and prevented stocking up of adequate food and supplies in Bataan and Corregidor.
