ABSTRACT
Brandt and Ostpolitik The 13 years 1969-82 were a period in which West Germany seemed to gain a greater importance, a new stature, in the international community. This was made possible by the Federal Republic’s con tinued economic expansion, and by its active diplomacy. The Ostpolitik of the early years of the S P D-F d p coalition laid the foundations of this new influence. Willy Brandt outlined his policy towards Poland in a press con
ference after his election as Chancellor on 21 October 1969. He welcomed the idea of opening diplomatic relations in the near future. A week later he indicated his view of relations with the German Democratic Republic. He reiterated the traditional West German position on the unity of the German people, commenting, ‘Even if there exist two states in Germany, they are not foreign countries to each other; their relations with each other can only be of a special nature’. He then went on to offer the East Germans negotiations at government level without discrimination on either side, which should lead to contractually agreed co-operation. For the first time a West German Chancellor had recognised the existence of the German Democratic Republic. Willi Stoph, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the d d r , found Brandt’s statement full of contradic tions but ‘there was a hint in it of a more realistic assessment of the situation created in Europe as a result of the Second World War’. On this basis, Walter Ulbricht presented a draft treaty on relations between the two German states to President Heinemann. After more statements, some delays, correspondence and backstairs diplomacy, Brandt and Stoph met at Erfurt (D D R) on 19 March 1970. The people of that ancient town gave Brandt an enthusiastic welcome which seems to have taken the politicians of both states somewhat by surprise. The two heads of government conferred again in the West German town of Kassel on 21 May. In the meantime the two states had signed a postal agreement and Bonn announced measures aimed
at helping the other Germany to export more to the Federal Republic and thus reduce its trade deficit. As a further gesture to the S E D, the Bundestag repealed the so-called ‘safe conduct’ law. Highly offensive to the East German leadership, this had granted certain s E D politicians immunity from prosecution on visits to West Germany. It had been originally introduced at the time of the abortive SPD-SED talks of 1966. Negotiations also followed with the USSR, Brandt fully understanding that on their success depended the future of relations with East Germany. A treaty on the renunciation of force was signed in Moscow on 12 August 1970 by the two states. Thus 31 years after the signing of the notorious Hitler-Stalin Non-Aggression Pact the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union had agreed on a treaty which made a genuine contribution to peace and understanding. Article 3 bound the two nations to respect the territorial integrity of all states in Europe within their existing frontiers, including the Oder-Neisse line and the frontiers between the DDR and the Federal Republic. The treaty opened the way for the other agreements which followed. In December the Federal Republic and Poland signed a treaty Article 1 of which stated that the signatories agreed that the Oder-Neisse fine ‘shall constitute the Western state frontier of the People’s Republic of Poland’. With the initialling of the treaty the Polish government announced its intention to allow those ethnic Germans who wished to leave for the Federal Republic to go. The position of West Berlin was regulated by the Four Power agreement of 3 September 1971. The west gained Soviet recognition of the close ties between West Berlin and the Federal Republic and its guarantee of the unimpeded move ment of people and goods between the Western Sectors and West Germany. West Berliners were, in future, to have normal oppor tunities to visit East Berlin and the D D R for tourist, cultural and business reasons. In return the Western Powers recognised, once again, that the Western sectors are not part of the Federal Republic or governed by it. The treaty put paid to the West German practice of holding important state occasions in West Berlin, such as the election of the Federal President or plenary sessions of the Bundestag. The West Germans were, however, authorised to maintain a permanent liaison agency in West Berlin. In return the Soviet Union gained the right to install a consulate-general there. The three Western Powers, by signing the treaty, did not give up their view that the whole of Berlin remained under Four Power control. Even after they later recognised the DDR they still continued to exercise their right to send patrols, unhindered by the East Germans, through East Berlin. As for the West Germans, the three Western Powers had pointed out in 1949, 1954 and 1967 that West Berlin was not a Land of the Federal
Republic. For them West German laws had not applied in West Berlin, only identical laws agreed by the parliament of West Berlin. The military service laws and the emergency powers laws of the Federal Republic, for instance, did not apply in West Berlin. From the standpoint of the Four Powers, therefore, West Germany was losing nothing by the 1971 treaty. The most fundamental of the treaties which arose from the Ostpolitik
was the so-called Basic Treaty (Grundvertrag) between the Federal Republic and the Democratic Republic. Signed on 21 December 1972, it obligated both states to develop good neighbourly relations on the basis of the aims and principles of the United Nations’ Charter. The two states further agreed to respect the sovereignty of each other, to renounce force, to work for disarmament and to solve the practiced and humanitarian problems which stood between them. In 1974 the Federal Republic and the DDR agreed to exchange special represent atives, not ambassadors, having diplomatic status. In a letter to the East German government Herr Brandt reaffirmed that the Basic Treaty did not contradict West Germany’s aim to work for the right of self-determination of the German people and for German reunifica tion. In 1973 there were other great strides forward in Ostpolitik with the establishment of full diplomatic relations between West Germany and Finland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Bulgaria, the admission of the two German states into the United Nations and the opening of the Helsinki Conference by 32 states of Eastern and Western Europe, Canada and the United States. Herr Brandt had no easy time in trying to get the Ostpolitik
accepted in Bonn. Many Christian Democrats claimed that he was giving much away and getting very little in return. With his slender majority he was abandoning some of the most cherished principles of all previous administrations-the position of West Berlin as a Land of the Republic according to Article 23 of the Basic Law, the right of the Federal Republic to speak for all Germans, the non-recognition of the d d r , the rejection of the Oder-Neisse frontier and the right to their Heimat of those expelled from beyond it, and the Hallstein doctrine. The reality of the situation was, however, that West Germany’s ability to enforce its claims weakened with every year which passed. The world felt West Germany had re-emerged in a way which no one had dreamt of in 1945 or even 1949, and should be content to acquiesce in these losses. By clinging to its old claims West Germany was inviting suspicion and hostility in Eastern Europe, and growing impatience in the West. Though there were critics of Brandt’s Ostpolitik in the United States, Bonn’s most powerful ally was seeking detente with the Soviet Union and therefore welcomed
Brandt’s basic approach. As for the Soviet Union, this period was a good time to negotiate with the Kremlin leadership. They feared that the growing Sino-American friendship could be at their expense. By landing a man successfully on the moon in 1969 the Americans had shown that the Russians had no advantage over them in this area. For these, and other, reasons the Soviets were prepared to come to the conference table. The initiatives of the S P D-F D P government greatly increased the prestige and moral stature of the Federal Republic in all those states which had been belligerents in the Second World War. Nor did the Basic Treaty do anything to lessen the feeling of kinship between the citizens of the two Germanies. As former Governing Mayor of West Berlin Brandt knew better than most Bonn politicians the realities, in human terms, of the division of Germany. This was also true of some of his colleagues. Herr Genscher, f d p Minister of Interior, was born and brought up in Halle (d d r) and still had relations there. Professor Schiller was born in Breslau, now in Poland, and Annemarie Renger, S P D Bundestag President was bom in Leipzig. Egon Bahr, who did so much of the negotiating with the East Germans on Brandt’s behalf was born in Treffurt (d D r). His aim, like Brandt’s was, in no small degree, to improve the situation for those millions of Germans suffering through the partition. This they certainly did. The two million West Berliners could now visit the DDR without much difficulty. Once again they could phone their relations in the other half of the city. Between June 1972 and May 1978 19.58 million visits by West Berliners were recorded in East Berlin or East Germany proper. In 1977 alone there were 3.4 million visits by West Berliners in the d d r including East Berlin. The three million or so Germans who had left the DDR between 1949-1971 could once again visit their relatives without the danger of being arrested as deserters. In 1976 3.1 million West Germans visited the DDR, in 1977 2.9 million did so. Because of the Basic Treaty roughly 6.5 million West Germans living in the frontier areas became eligible to visit the frontier region of the DDR. In 1977 around 443,000 such daily visits were made. In the other direction it proved easier for old age pensioners from the D D R to visit West Germany. In addition, up to the end of 1977 an estimated 215,000 East Germans under retirement age had been able to visit the Federal Republic on ‘compelling family business’. This included attending weddings, funerals, etc. The Ostpolitik also resulted in many thousands of ethnic Germans from Eastern Europe being permitted to emigrate to West Germany. In both political and human terms Brandt’s policy was a success. His personal achievement was recognised in 1971 when he was awarded the Nobel Prize for peace, the first German to be so honoured since Carl von Ossietzky, the pacifist, in 1935.
