Three sources for tacit knowledge
This chapter attempts to use an account of nonconceptual content to motivate a rival understanding of the kind of worldly coping that author have associated with tacit knowing. What counts as nonconceptual content depends in large part on how one conceives of the conceptual and proponents of nonconceptual content often take as their target McDowell's brand of conceptualism. The author concludes that whatever naturalistic imperative there might be for invoking in an explanatory context some background to our reflective practices can be captured therapeutically by exploiting an understanding of Aristotle's account of second nature, albeit one disburdened of McDowell's empiricist ambitions. Addressing directly the underdetermined nature of Evans's position in the face of McDowell's criticisms, Richard Heck, for example, proposes we distinguish "state" from "content" nonconceptualism. The desire to account for freedom within the constraints of the kind of naturalism pressed upon us by an awareness of our facticity is one of the motivating factors behind a conceptualism like McDowell's.