Wittgenstein’s regress argument and personal knowledge
This conclusion presents some closing thoughts of key concepts discussed in preceding chapters of this book. This book outlines a conception of tacit knowledge as context-dependent, conceptually structured, practical knowledge. Any plausible account of tacit knowledge must respect its status both as tacit and as knowledge. Tacit knowledge is both ordinary and surprising. It is ordinary because it is merely a practical species of knowledge, sharing with the rest of that genus a reliability, although not infallibility, which goes beyond luck, although in this case that is based on a standing capacity or skill rather than any other form of justification. With that aid, however, what one knows can be articulated. Tacit knowledge is a species of the genus of knowledge without being either an instance of context-independent knowledge, that nor even context-dependent knowledge-that. Its articulation, what a subject with it knows, is also practical.