ABSTRACT
In the twentieth century, anti-philosophy, specifically hostility to metaphysics, occupied a central position in academic philosophy. The most consistent professional anti-philosopher in the Anglo-Saxon tradition was G. E. Moore, Wittgenstein's predecessor in the Chair of Philosophy at the University of Cambridge. His theory of 'sense data' as intermediaries between minds and material objects opened the door to the very scepticism to which he had raised not two hands but two fingers. The heart of Moore's 'proof' is a direct demonstration of the existence of objects in the external world. Some might feel that Moore's proof, far from resolving Kant's 'scandal' has simply hushed it up. A rich and complex tradition of sceptical epistemology that has lain at the heart of philosophy for 2,500 years has been ignored. His various unsatisfactory solutions illustrate Bradley's statement that philosophers who dismiss metaphysics tend to be brother metaphysicians with stories of their own to sell.
