ABSTRACT

In our last two chapters we have covered much ground on the question of race. In particular, we have spent time getting clear about what our ordinary concept of race comes to; what its most central features are. We have also seen that our ordinary concept can make no claim to scientic reality – none of the appropriate scientic concepts seem to lend it credence, and a host of biological evidence suggests that most of the assumptions we make about race are unfounded. e take-home message of Chapter 1, then, was that, in terms of biological science and biological kinds, race is not real. In Chapter 2, however, we spent much time examining the sociohistorical background to our concept of race – how it arose, and how various categories and racial notions are shaped by the socio-political pressures in any given context. We also saw that quite what we make of these socio-historical facts will vary. We might think these social facts make race a candidate social kind, and thus real. Alternatively, we might think these social facts make for interesting explanations of our racialized behaviours, but at the same time not see this as necessarily reality conferring; or we might see these social facts as suggesting a way to move forward with our concept of race.