ABSTRACT

For a number of reasons which have been well rehearsed elsewhere1 the immediate post-war generation of German historians was preoccupied with the study of high politics in the conservative scholarly tradition. During the 1960s a younger generation successfully challenged this conservative interpretation of recent German history both intellectually and institutionally.2 The overall thesis that this new interpretation generated has been extremely fruitful in terms of the research it has inspired, and it has become widely accepted — so much so that it has been referrred to as a ‘new orthodoxy’. It sees Wilhelmine Germany as a basically preindustrial society suddenly catapulted into the industrial age.3 German industrialisation certainly occurred much later than in Britain or France, where the origins of industrialisation are often traced back to the 1750s.4 Germany cannot be regarded as partially industrialised even as late as the 1820s (although a convincing case has been made for regarding the period 1800-50 as a period of ‘proto-industrialisation’ in certain parts of what was later the German empire).5 It is also claimed that German industrialisation was partial, in that some sectors of the economy industrialised very rapidly, while others lagged behind. Again there is certainly a great deal of evidence to back up this view, although the evenness of British and French industrialisation should not be overemphasised. Finally, it is claimed, industrialisation in Germany was much more rapid than was the case in Britain or France. As a result of these three factors a series of stresses and strains was set up within the social fabric, and the pre-industrial ruling élites were obliged to come to terms with new social forces without the time for adjustment which Britain and France had supposedly enjoyed. This set of circumstances is sometimes referred to as ‘synchronous anachronism’ (gleichzeitige Ungleichzeitigkeit).6 This notion helps

account for both the reaction of the pre-industrial élites (regarded by some as social imperialism)7 and their (later) attempts to use Nazism. It also helps explain the political reaction of the middle classes to the threat posed by the working-class movement, and eventually, the underlying appeal of Nazi ideology.