ABSTRACT
Introduction: Al Qaeda’s ‘future works’ Two events in May 2011 presented us with a treasure trove of information on Al Qaeda’s strategic and operational future plans. The fi rst one was the now famous raid on Osama bin Laden’s hide-out in Abbottabad, Pakistan, on 2 May 2011 that also resulted in a wealth of information found on laptops, memory sticks, CDs and other devices. The second one was the less widely reported arrest of Maqsood Lodin, an Austrian of Pakistani origin, by German police in Berlin on 16 May 2011. In his possession were digital storage devices containing more than a hundred documents, amongst them one titled Future Works , which also revealed an interesting Al Qaeda ‘twin track’ strategy consisting of a series of ‘low cost, low tech attacks’ on the one hand, and the planning for a large-scale attack comparable to 9/11 on the other. 1
The information found in both incidents does not leave any doubt that Al Qaeda still has an interest in terrorist strikes at sea or against port facilities, with a special focus on attacking oil tankers at maritime choke points. 2 Likewise, an increasing incidence of ‘rhetoric and threat’ 3 in the shape of blogs and e-jihadist forum chatter related to maritime terrorism or ‘sea terrorism’, in addition to reported plans of Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) 4 and other parts of the now rather dysfunctional Al Qaeda universe, point at a renewed interest in operations at the maritime front, after a lacuna of a couple of years. Amongst the plans were several ones revolving around so-called ‘water-borne improvised explosive devices’ (WBIED) in the shape of suicide boats steered into a vessel of choice, plus one featuring the hijack of a cruise liner which also involved putting the hostages into orange boiler suits like those worn by the inmates of the detention centre at Guantanamo Bay and shooting them one by one until the political demands had been met. Both types of plan are variations of tried-and-tested ‘low impact, high probability’ tactics used before, the WBIED one for example in the cases of the US Navy’s guided-missile destroyer USS Cole (DDG-67) and the French-fl agged tanker M/V Limburg attacks in 2000 and 2002, and the hijack one in the case of the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro in 1984 on the political front and numerous vessels of all sizes on the (Somali) pirate side of things. Notably absent were more ambitious maritime terrorism scenarios of the ‘high impact’ or ‘mega terrorism’ nature that had been predicted by many observers in the immediate aftermath of 9/11.
