ABSTRACT
The second decade of the century confronts American military and naval forces with a diff erent set of challenges than those of the previous ten years. Public support to confront terrorism, on the scale that followed the 9/11 attacks, has receded. Instead, that challenge is now the province of intelligence agencies and the U.S. military’s potent, but numerically small, Special Operations Forces. Conversely, the potential for national rivalry, even warfare, seems to be increasing, with challenges to America spanning the heart and east coasts of Asia. 2 That the oceans adjoining those regions include a main artery of world trade makes the challenge only more diffi cult, with analyst Daniel Gouré’s words best capturing their magnitude: “the end of history is over.” 3
This chapter’s frame is rooted in historical works, balanced against U.S. government fi nances. It draws from the writing of Carl von Clausewitz to portray the Navy and Marine Corps as the maritime means needed to fulfi ll U.S. presidents’ political ends. Fundamentally, it attempts to show how the devil truly is in the details, for any current discussion must be rooted in the specifi cs of twenty-fi rst-century U.S. federal politics, especially fi nances. That condition stems from how government resources shape what forces and equipment the Navy and Marine Corps can create. 4 These problems are not new, having been confronted by the sea services after the end of the Vietnam War in 1975. 5 But the chapter’s bias, to favor the “with what?” question of strategy, that is force structure and equipment, as opposed to questions of where and why American force will be used, is here because the country’s present-day politics demands such an awareness.
