ABSTRACT
The promise of a new system of international relations after the cold war – especially the prospect of a true partnership between Russia and the US – looked substantial to the optimists of the early 1990s. While some might argue it was in part realised at times, the promise of a New World Order was certainly not fulfilled. Indeed, recent examples of political conflict and rivalry may suggest a possible return to the ‘bad old days’ of the cold war or at least the evolution of a twenty-first century international system that is not all that different from the great power rivalries of previous centuries. What remains to be seen is whether Russian foreign policy will be characterised in the future by patterns similar to the Soviet or imperial past, leading to increased tension and rivalry with the US and perhaps Eurasia powers or whether common interests and the initial efforts to work out means of cooperating in the face of common challenges will ultimately prevail. Is there the prospect of Russia helping to ‘construct’ a new global order? Central Asia and the Caucasus offer a special challenge in this respect, given the US role in the regions recently, and the interests of other key states – most notably China, Turkey, India, Iran, and Pakistan. What explains this configuration of policies? Does an explanation and projection simply require an assessment of geopolitical national interests? Or do we need a much more complex analysis, deriving from a mix of persistent national interest calculations, historical traditions, international systemic influences, domestic political and economic constraints, leadership perceptions and predilections, and the struggle to establish a new identity for Russia in a perplexing global environment. This chapter examines this complex picture with special emphasis on Russian policy towards Central Asia and the Caucasus since the early 1990s, with some reference to future prospects given the expected reduced role of the US in Afghanistan after 2014.
