ABSTRACT
This chapter begins with contemporary naive realism, defended by John Campbell, Bill Fish, and Michael Martin, among others. It argues that it violates internal dependence: the empirically determined role of the internal processing of the brain in shaping phenomenal character. This will bring us to the inner state view Brian McLaughlin, and David Papineau, among others. The chapter shows that, while it accommodates "internal-dependence", it fails to accommodate the essential "externally directedness" of experience. It also argues that only representationalists can adequately explain both of these features of experience. Compare how a mercury thermometer and a thermoelectric thermometer have different internal states but detect the same temperatures and temperature-differences. Given bad external correlation and good internal correlation, naive realists' externalist approach fails. The broadly internalist approaches we will look at later—the "inner state view" and "brain-based representationalism"—deny the claim of naïve realism that the sensible properties of items are explained by those items' objective physical properties alone.
