ABSTRACT
This chapter is essentially concerned with two interests that are frequently perceived as being in conflict – the administration of justice and media freedom. The protection of the administration of justice is a general aim that is not concerned solely with protecting the right of the individual to a fair trial, although it may have that effect. Domestically, the interest in the administration of justice has been protected by the law of contempt, although obviously the main responsibility for ensuring fairness in criminal trials or civil actions remains with the judge. A number of aspects of contempt law are discussed below, including its use in curbing pre-trial discussions and publicity in the media that might influence those involved in forthcoming proceedings; threats to justice in the long-term sense, and requirements to disclose journalistic sources. It is apparent that, prima facie, contempt law creates interferences with the guarantee of freedom of expression under Art 10. The interference may be justified where it has the legitimate aim of ‘maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary’ under para 2. This phrase may be taken to cover the preservation of the integrity of the administration of justice, including the rights of litigants. Since contempt law has a role to play in preventing prejudice to proceedings or in deterring the media from causing such prejudice, it may be viewed as a means of protecting Art 6 rights,2 although the main responsibility for providing such protection falls on the trial judge.3 Viewed as exceptions to Art 10, such rights fall within the rubric ‘the rights of others’ in para 2, as well as that of ‘maintaining the authority of the judiciary’. (Since court proceedings may bring an
are revealed, the guarantee of respect for private life under Art 8 may also be relevant; the implications of this possibility are discussed in Part III, Chapter 10.) Contempt law therefore comes into conflict with free expression, either on the basis of protecting general societal interests or other individual rights. Article 6 is not engaged where the threat is to the administration of justice in a general or long-term sense. Similarly, the use of contempt law to require the disclosure of sources would not normally engage Art 6, although it clearly does create an interference with the Art 10 guarantee, and moreover one which is viewed at Strasbourg as particularly serious, as indicated below.
