ABSTRACT
The new official course of India-China ties is termed as ‘developmental partnership’, which was primarily construed during President Xi Jinping’s visit to India in September 2014 (PIB 2015). Its essence is to forge a closer economic partnership, enhancing the decade-old Strategic and Cooperative Partnership of Peace and Prosperity. The Joint Statement of the two countries, released on 11 April 2005, outlined the core of the Strategic and Cooperative Partnership as being based on the ‘principles of Panchsheel, mutual respect and sensitivity for each other’s concerns and aspirations, and equality . . .’ (MEA 2005).1 This partnership called for ‘all-round and comprehensive development’ of bilateral ties to be based on ‘mutual and equal security, development and prosperity’. The 2005 Joint Statement took note of increased political exchanges, better economic cooperation, stronger connectivity, and strengthening exchanges and interactions in various fields. This expressed vision came within the thrust of the Panchsheel discourse. Since its formulation officially on 29 April 1954, the Panchsheel doctrine has been a matter of great debate in the international relations discourse. Primarily originated as an ‘Agreement on Trade and Intercourse’ (MEA 2004a) between the Tibet Region of China and India, it was neither a fully accredited IndiaChina bilateral accord nor was it comprehensive enough to address the IndiaChina-Tibet complexity. The Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence (Panchsheel) that the agreement envisaged comprised: (i) mutual respect for each other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty; (ii) mutual non-aggression; (iii) mutual non-interference; (iv) equality and mutual benefit; and (v) peaceful coexistence. On 28 June 1954, the visiting Premier of China, Zhou Enlai, and the Prime Minister of India, Jawaharlal Nehru, issued a Joint Statement elaborating the course of Panchsheel. Soon thereafter, the optimism of the Panchsheel vision was put to the test in the context of the Chinese interference in Ladakh in 1954, complication of the Tibetan matter and the rising bilateral differences over the boundary leading to the 1962 war (Madhav 2014). In consequence, Panchsheel has been seen in India’s domestic discourse more as a deception principle that is linked with India’s territorial loss and national security complexity. For the Chinese, on the other hand, Panchsheel has been a fundamental collection of principles in their
outreach policy. Chinese experts have for long envisaged Panchsheel as a useful instrument in their dialogue of a multipolar world order.2 Currently, if the two countries’ bilateral ties have become more methodical, much of the credit goes to the 2005 agreement. A range of bilateral dialogue mechanisms exists today in India-China relations. Two things that have significantly contributed to enhancing India-China ties are: trade and economic contacts, and political engagement. India-China trade has witnessed a steady rise in the last decade (see Figure 2.1), rising from around US$18 billion in 2004 to $70 billion in 2014 and is set to cross $70 billion by 2016. Political engagement has also been steady (see Table 2.1).
