ABSTRACT
The 13th meeting of the Council of Ministers of the Indian Ocean Rim Association for Regional Cooperation (IOR-ARC), held on 1 November 2013 at Perth, resulted in the IOR-ARC being renamed as the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA). The Perth communiqué outlined how IORA member countries must reaffirm their trust and commitment to build ‘stability, security and prosperity’ in the IOR region and boost prospects of regional economic growth and collaboration (mea.gov.in 2013). Notably, as the only comprehensive multilateral body in the Indian Ocean, IORA binds together 20 countries, six dialogue partners, and two observers, namely, the Indian Ocean Research Group (IORG) and the Indian Ocean Tourism Organisation (IOTO). As a dialogue partner, China has been participating in IORA deliberations ever since it was inducted in 2000. Engaging with a multilateral body requires constructive foreign policy forethought, especially for a country that is not its full-fledged member. China’s overtures to IORA exemplify this approach. With 20 member states, extraterritorial major powers as important dialogue partners, and the increasing importance of energy politics in the region, IORA becomes a significant multilateral body today in China’s calculus. For India, China’s power construct in this matter poses three challenges: Beijing as a maritime power, Beijing as a marine economy and Beijing as a polygonal power.
