ABSTRACT
This chapter discusses a different minimal theory of mindreading; namely, Ian Apperly and Stephen Butterfill’s two-systems account of mindreading. It deals with a brief exposition of the key points of his position, showing how perceived shortcomings with it motivated the two-system approach. Two-system theorists maintain that the phenomenon can be explained by claiming that infants and non-human animals only have the first, fast and modular, system of mindreading. The chapter presents some of the key data regarding fast and slow mindreading in adults and why they motivated a two-system approach and provide more detail about the two-system theory. Location-change false belief tasks, therefore, cannot be used to test between the two-systems and Infant Mindreading hypotheses. System-Two mindreading is that which facilitates our ability to attribute propositional attitudes and other complex mental states to other people. A good account of social cognition needs to explain both the similarities and differences in mindreading perceived across cultures.
