ABSTRACT
The debates about the evolutionary origins of mindreading are inextricably entwined with arguments about: which aspects of mindreading might be innate; different mechanisms for inheriting mindreading skills; and which mindreading skills may be shared with our evolutionary ancestors and present in apes and other primates. While philosophers had plenty to say about this in the 1980s in response to the ‘platitudinous’ view of theory of mind and the Churchlands’ Eliminative Materialism, the topic has lain relatively dormant. empirical work can help philosophers better understand phenomena like joint attention, where conceptual analysis appeared to hit a brick wall until experimental data helped elucidate the nature of the problem. Neuroscientists are increasingly drawn to the idea of a distinct ‘mentalising’ network for explicit thinking about another’s beliefs, and how this network may relate to those that facilitate less complex mindreading.
