ABSTRACT
Simulations are used in lots of situations to help people gain a new understanding of a phenomenon. The sticking point for the Simulation theory is that the decision-making system operates in a way that biases the right side, as evidenced by its workings in actual situations. The persistent problem is that neither theory-theorists nor Simulation theorists have been clear about what it means for a cognitive system to have ‘tacit knowledge’ of a principle. Simulation theory was originally introduced to challenge theory-theory views, both scientific theory-theory and Nativist theory-theory accounts. In their turn, those who maintain that the mindreading system has a theory-like structure have accepted an important role for simulation processes where ‘simulation’ is understood as ‘using the same process’ to make our own decisions and predict those of others. The ‘threat of collapse’ challenge to simulation is a fascinating one, with implications of cognitive science more generally.
