ABSTRACT

For the Chinese, integration and disintegration are two sides of the same coin. To what extent this dynastical cycle of unity-division is applicable to Russia’s post-Soviet integration effort is debatable. Russia’s rebound from ‘the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the century’,1 however, is unmistakably visible. Aside from Russia’s internal consolidation, particularly since 2000, Moscow’s attempts to institutionalize and consolidate various integrating mechanisms – from the earlier Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO)2 to the more recent Customs Union (CU)-turned-Common Economic Space (CES) – have gone to great lengths and are now accelerating during the Putin 3.0 phase.3 Until the current violence across Ukraine, President Viktor Yanukovych’s pro-Eurasian tilt looked like another huge win for Moscow. Russia’s fresh impetus for Eurasian integration can also be considered part

of Russia’s broader and long-term strategy aiming to make Russia a more independent, or ‘self-standing, great power with global reach’.4 These efforts culminated in 2013 with a series of diplomatic successes including the softlanding of the Syrian chemical arms crises and the historical agreements regarding the Iranian nuclear issue. Russia’s foreign policy success should never have been underestimated, particularly in the aftermath of some recent developments such as the ‘colour revolutions’ sweeping through the postSoviet space, the 2008 global financial crisis and the Russian-Georgian war of the same year. It may also explain, at least partially, the growing criticism and counter actions from the West, particularly during the 2013 Sochi Winter Olympic Games and the ongoing Ukraine crises.