ABSTRACT
This chapter explores how European Union (EU) member states have struggled since the mid-1990s to promote fiscal rectitude and safeguard the single currency regime. The imposition of Hayekian rules from above-which French analyst Philippe Legrain has referred to as fiscal colonialism in which European Union institutions have become instruments for creditors to impose their will on debtors 20-begs the third question, involving the democratic legitimacy of the economic and monetary union (EMU) regime. Democratically elected governments must now have their budgets, documents encompassing national priorities for public action, scrutinized and approved by the European Commission before national parliaments may vote on them. There is disagreement among scholars regarding the implications of the strengthening of the EMU fiscal regime for the European Union's democratic deficit. Some have claimed the EU does not suffer from a significant democratic deficit, whether in general or in their procedures for strengthening the post-2009 fiscal regime.
