ABSTRACT
Every moral demandingness objection presupposes that there is something like demandingness. The author contends that there is a broader class of 'eudaimonistic' considerations that is significant. Still, Wallace's position is afflicted with the same obscurity. This is the criticism: "[W]hen deliberating we consider which reasons are most pressing in a way which transcends and defers the common division of practical thought into moral and self-interested considerations". His criticism here has led to two interpretations: According to the strong reading, Raz denies any way of distinguishing between the moral and personal point of view and corresponding reasons. It is noteworthy that Raz continues to debate the connection of values and social forms. The key to the answer comes with another case he mentions, namely a person that - due to contingent external circumstances - needs to decide whether to volunteer as a driver for a food convey that will prevent many people from starving.
