ABSTRACT
The most prominent interpretation of the principle 'ought implies can' (OIC) is that 'ought' conceptually implies 'can'. This chapter argues against the dominant conceptual interpretation, which also includes a double time-indexed version of both 'ought' and 'can'. It explains the conceptual interpretation of OIC in more detail. Michael J. Zimmerman understands the notion of 'ought' in terms of an action-guiding, all-things-considered, objective moral obligation. The introduction of a double time-indexed version of both 'ought' and 'can' is intended to ensure that propositions about both concepts are always valid at the same time. The notion of 'ought' in OIC states what an agent, all things considered and from an objective point of view, morally ought to do. Descriptive statements are aimed at depicting truthfully some actual state of affairs, i.e., to fit the world. Normative claims, including moral obligations, however, are not meant to aim at depicting truthfully some actual state of affairs.
