ABSTRACT
This chapter proposes to examine both Fink's and Sartre's analysis of Husserl's theory of imagination by inquiring first into the unity of the concept of imagination. Between 1930 and 1940, Fink and Sartre tried to address the question of imagination in the field of phenomenology and the irreality of its correlative. The outline of the first part of Fink's study shows unambiguously this rigorous separation by proposing in the first section 'a provisional analysis of presentifications' including an analysis of Phantasie, and in the second section 'a provisional analysis of consciousness of image'. For example, dreamlike consciousness, like any imaging consciousness, presents on the basis of this positional act of a presence absence a more specific character. Sartre, at the beginning of the imaginary, distinguishes four ways for imaging consciousness to posit its object as irreal. One cannot here situate Fink's theses as well as Sartre's theory of imaging consciousness in relationship to the whole of Husserl's work.
