ABSTRACT
This chapter discusses the role of perception in theoretical and practical activity within the phenomena of the 'being-in-the-world' and the 'life world'. It analyzes the way Heidegger treats perception in relation to the modes of concern of Dasein with innerwordly beings, whereby perception is assimilated to theory. The phenomenological analysis of Dasein as being-in-the-world necessary entails a detailed phenomenology of innerworldly beings insofar as the relation with innerworldly beings is an existential item of Existenz. The chapter shows that Husserl in Experience and Judgment defends the thesis that perception underlies both, theoretical and practical behavior. It addresses the problem that Husserl assigns to perception itself a contemplative interest. The distinction between two concepts of interest allows him to face Heidegger's tenet that perception is subsumed into theoretical behavior.
