ABSTRACT
This chapter considers whether contextualism about knowledge ascriptions provides a satisfactory response to one of the most popular and influential forms of skepticism. In epistemology, the most widely discussed version of contextualism is the view that knowledge-talk is context-sensitive. Contextualists disagree about how the standards get raised, including whether they are raised by merely considering skepticism. Contextualism combines a view about the semantics of knowledge ascriptions with an error theory according to which competent speakers are systematically misled by contextualist semantics. The contextualist is committed to positing a degree of "semantic ignorance". The chapter discusses several objections to the contextualist solution to skepticism. The most common interpretation is that contextualism is too skeptic-friendly, because as soon as skepticism is mentioned participants in the conversation can no longer truthfully claim to have "knowledge". Several philosophers who grant the truth of contextualism nevertheless doubt that contextualism is of any relevance to epistemology.
