ABSTRACT
This chapter provides a survey of situation-sensitive accounts of belief. It avoids the lottery problem by postulating one or another kind of situation sensitivity. The chapter describes the four kinds of situation-sensitive accounts. One's situation might determine a threshold such that one believes only those propositions in which one has credence over the threshold; it might determine a partition, contributing a set of propositions over which some quantifier in a condition on belief ranges; it might determine a set of options, again governing a quantifier in a condition on belief; or it might determine a set of presuppositions, bounding a space of salient possibilities. The chapter offers a belief-analogue of a familiar sort of argument for k-contextualism: case pairs. It sketches how one might motivate b-contextualism based on accepting a situation-sensitive account of belief. The chapter outlines Eric Schwitzgebel's phenomenal, dispositional account of belief.
