ABSTRACT
This chapter explores the view according to which conversations where one party utters a sentence of the form "S knows that p" and another utters "S does not know that p" can involve genuine disagreement, even if the content of "knows" is fixed by appeal to the different standards of justification that the speakers have in mind. It examines the conditional claim that if one believes that David Plunkett and Tim Sundell's metalinguistic analysis of disagreement involving moral, ethical and aesthetic terms is plausible, then one should also believe that the metalinguistic analysis of disagreements involving epistemological terms is also plausible. Plunkett and Sundell argue that the combination of views can be used in order to block an influential argument against (attributor) contextualism. The chapter discusses two possible objections to the metalinguistic reply in general, and argues that the advocate of the metalinguistic reply can respond to those objections satisfactorily.
