ABSTRACT
The key idea of the Partial Simulation Defence is that children must learn to perform two tasks when simulating. This Partial Simulation Defence explains the data without appealing to theory and thus provides a defence of simulation theory (ST) against theory theory (TT). Peterson and Riggs suggest a model of Theory of Mind (ToM) which was developed using considerations of efficiency arising from database theory. They introduce two forms of reasoning they see as underlying ToM abilities, Standard Derivation (SD) and Modified Derivation (MD). The idea is that SD reasoning involves no changes to known facts or perspectives. MD will then account for the changes to generate a view from somewhere else. Ruffman examines one possible defence of ST, which asks 'whether it was deception per se that accounted for children's better performance on the False Belief Inference task'. This is done by introducing a deceptive version of the true belief test.
