ABSTRACT
This chapter examines the contingency upon which law rests by engaging with an ongoing debate between Quentin Meillassoux and psychoanalytic philosopher Slavoj Zizek. Particular attention will be paid to some logics of causation, particularly Meillassoux's weighty critique of correlationalism. Much contemporary legal philosophy has dealt with problems of existence vis-a-vis law, the ontology of legal forms and fictions, and so on. This speculative reading of ontology intimately connects with the task of philosophical analysis and presents a subject of philosophical and non-metaphysical speculation that demands endless necessary contingency. It is by engaging with this radical madness of the withdrawal from Chaos that Meillassoux is able to carve a new path for contingency. Meillassoux and Zizek are justified in their resistance to the totalisations of any logos, particularly that of post-secular philosophy, given this necessary contingency of Being.
