ABSTRACT
Our focus in this book has been on the geography of elections, and we have highlighted three particular aspects of that geography; (1) the spatial variations in voting for different candidates, parties and issues which reflect the spatial division of labour and the process of politicization; (2) the locational variables which are related to information flows and influence how voters react to various political issues; and (3) the effect of the division of a territory into constituencies on the translation of votes into seats, and hence on the pattern of representation. Within such a frame work, we have considered the election as an event in its own right, worthy of study for its own sake. But the purpose of an election is to allocate political power (as compared with a referendum or plebiscite, which is conducted to obtain a decision on a particular issue). If there are important geographical influences on voting and representation, then these should be followed by similar influences on the allocation of power, and so it is to this topic that we address our final chapter. In doing so, our interest moves away from the interaction between voters and political actors and focuses instead on the roles and performances of the successful actors in the election process. As Cox (1976) has pointed out in a recent review, such a concern with the outputs of the electoral process is unusual among geographers, but it is crucial if the value of geographical study of the whole political system is to be demonstrated. The concept of power is a crucial one to much analysis in social
science, and its definition has been the focus of much debate. Our concern here is with a relatively narrow view of power, which is
that level of control over political decision-making which is allocated to different elected representatives. This is in line with the general positivist tone of the whole book; we accept the current electoral systems as given and analyse their inputs and outputs rather than focus on their position in the wider socio economic system (Miliband, 1969). Our aim is simply to illustrate the political implications of electoral systems. The political implications of electoral systems form a topic of
continuing interest, especially among those who favour some form of electoral reform. We have already looked at some of the implications of reform for the geography of representation in the preceding chapter; here we unravel that geography somewhat and investigate the political, as against the electoral, implications of ‘reform’. Interpretation of these implications must rest on models of how political systems should work; on whether, for example, the political arena should be one of conflict between adversaries or of consensus between people of differing shades of opinion (Finer, 1975). More than a concluding chapter in a book on the geography of elections would be necessary to examine all of these implications and interpretations. The most we can do here is to outline their nature, and to set the study of electoral and political geography firmly in the mainstream of social science. Much of the debate on electoral reform has been ad hoc in
nature, being based on reactions - especially among losers - to particular election results. But the topic has also been of con tinuing interest to political theorists and to philosophers, especially those concerned with such issues as equality and justice. Both the pragmatic and the theoretical points of view are being widely aired during the 1970s. In the United States, for example, the 1960s was a decade of great activity in reapportion ment, with attempts, largely generated from outside the estab lished political parties, to obtain democratic equality through redistricting (see Chapter 7), and there is still much discussion about the fairness of the electoral college system for electing presidents. In the United Kingdom, the two general elections of 1974 were judged by many as unfair to the Liberal Party and its supporters, and several groups - most of them self-appointed -
have been researching and writing about electoral reform (Finer, 1975; Mayhew, 1976; Rogaly, 1976). Interest increased during 1976 when the related issues of direct elections to the European Parliament, with the need for a common, community-wide electoral system for the second election in the early 1980s, and the nationalist revivals in Scotland and Wales came to the fore front of British political debate. Meanwhile, the Electoral Reform Society continues to argue for a certain electoral system to allow individuals the maximum freedom of choice, and in Australia the ever-interesting topic of rural over-representation was fiercely debated in both Houses in Canberra before the fall of Whitlam’s A.L.P. government. Within this general topic of electoral reform is the question,
‘Can some, if not all, of the geographical influences on elections be removed, to what end, and why?’. For some of the topics we have discussed in this book the answer is a clear ‘no’, at least as an independent action. The voting patterns which are consequent upon the spatial division of labour (Chapters 3 and 4) cannot be altered without one or both of: (1) a spatial reorganization of society which removes most of the current socio-economic segregation; and (2) a removal of the class bias to so much political behaviour, which undoubtedly would involve the removal of class itself. Discussion of the feasibility of such policies lies beyond the compass of this brief volume; in our context, the argument is that voting is a process deeply embedded in the existing social structure, and that changing this structure of society is the only way of changing the salient elements of the geography of voting. The topics we dealt with in Chapters 5 and 6, under the general
heading of geographical influences in voting, concern small-scale features which lead to various warpings of the general geo graphies of voting produced by the processes outlined in Chapters 3 and 4. In them, we take a micro-spatial view, based on the assumption that much of politics involves individuals trying to persuade others to pursue certain courses of action - whether to vote, who to vote for, etc. Whilst we continue to live most of our lives within the confines of relatively small areas, frequently
called neighbourhoods, then most of our social contacts are likely to remain local and some political discussion will be with our neighbours. And whilst housing markets are largely in the hands of capitalist institutions, spatial segregation of socio-economic classes will continue and so will class-based politics; the neigh bourhood effect is not independent of the society which creates the neighbourhoods. Similarly, for as long as elections have a strong component of being between individual candidates, home-based friends-and-neighbours effects are always likely. Local issues, local campaigns, and the geography of repre
sentation are the remaining topics. As with local candidates, local issues are always likely to arise in a particular electoral contest. Their impact could perhaps be reduced - the larger the average constituency the less likely that a local issue in one part will affect the whole result - but whether local issues should be important depends on one’s theory of representation, a topic we take up later. And with limited resources, including time as well as money, available to political contestants, campaigning is likely to be localized. We pointed out in Chapter 6 that the major effect of most campaigns is on turnout levels, and so their efficacy, indeed necessity, could be removed by the introduction of com pulsory voting. While constituencies remain as integral parts of an electoral system (and not just for convenience, as in the Nether lands - p. 63), however, and particularly if they are singlemember constituencies, then some places will be seen by candi dates and parties as more important to them than others,, If campaigning simply involves door-knocking and exhortations to ‘please vote’, there seems to be little to worry about, but if further research confirms the hypotheses concerning vote-buying in marginal constituencies (p. 314), then it could well be argued that the spatial allocation of public funds for the maintenance of a particular government is an abuse of political power. Even here, however, the amount spent on place-particular campaigns, rela tive to that on general programmes not aimed at particular areas, may well prove to be fairly small. If local issues and local campaigns are undesirable aspects of
the geography of elections, this will arise because of the geo
graphy of representation. This brings us firmly into the debate about the relative desirability of different electoral systems. In order to discuss this topic we need to be clear about the purposes of elections, most of which are conducted with more than one end in view. As one British prime minister, Ramsay MacDonald, argued in a House of Commons debate on electoral reform (the quote is from Butler, 1963, p. 59): ‘One view . . . is the static view where we are an exact replica, on a very small scale, of the millions of electors . . . the other view is that the real, final purpose of an election is to elect a government - and I use the word rather apart from merely electing a House of Commons’. The British parlia ment, therefore, comprises members who combine two major roles, representing the electorate and forming a government/ opposition system in which one group or coalition of groups has the major political power without fear that it may lose it on any particular issue; most parliaments (including various local govern ment bodies) are similarly composed of members who perform these two roles. In constructing an electoral system, the following four criteria
are generally considered important: (1) Elections should be organized so as to ensure democratic
equality for the participants - ‘one man, one vote; one vote, one value’. (2) Elections should be organized so that the different views
held by the electorate are proportionally represented in the par liament.* (3) Elections should produce governments which do not have a
narrow, sectional base in the geography of representation. (4) Elections should give voters the maximum possible choice.
