ABSTRACT
The nuclear arms control agenda has three interlinked components: nonproliferation, arms control and disarmament. The nonproliferation agenda having been more or less secured, the urgent requirement now is to emplace an increasing number of verifiable constraints on the policies, practices and arsenals of the nuclear weapons states (NWS). The historic and favourable changes in the world strategic situation must be embedded in structures that consolidate, deepen and reinforce the nonproliferation, arms control and disarmament regimes in their normative, technical-denial and compliance-cum-enforcement attributes. This chapter concludes compatible with a belief in the utility of nuclear weapons. But just as national security cannot a priori be privileged over other forms of security, so the utility of nuclear weapons cannot be privileged over the costs, risks and alternatives. Unilateral renunciations of nuclear weapons by one or both would underscore the break, brought about by India and Pakistan, between permanent membership of the Security Council and possession of nuclear weapons.
