ABSTRACT
This study argues that peacekeeping today is built on collective cooperative efforts conducted by a number of actors ranging from the sub-regional to the global level. IOs do not deploy peacekeeping missions alone in isolation from one another – the dominant mode of peacekeeping is cooperative. All major actors are deeply intertwined in a larger system of security governance, forming an African security regime complex. Regime complexes are a fluid form of governance in which no central organising entity exists but actors rely on each other to enhance their performance and exchange resources. In the case of peacekeeping in Africa, we can observe how various actors are cautiously converging around country-specific conflicts and forming a security regime complex. Earlier chapters empirically mapped the most essential actors, their peacekeeping doctrines and the capabilities of the UN, AU, RECs, EU and single lead states. Furthermore, these chapters displayed how interinstitutional linkages have been established and how these institutions work independently of specific conflict countries. Indeed, today there is a growing institutionalised network between IOs. Decision-making bodies at the highest level meet regularly. At working level a number of joint task forces have been established too. All larger IOs entertain liaison offices at each other’s headquarters, while it cannot be ignored that IOs have moved closer together, intersecting frequently and operating in the same theatre. This has started a process of convergence that warrants further reaching exploration. These inter-institutional linkages most often in the form of joint meetings form the institutional skeleton or infrastructure of the African security regime complex. In contrast to peacekeeping operations, they are permanent structures designed to facilitate dialogue and a general platform enabling a joint response to emerging or continuing conflicts. However, so far these inter-institutional structures have often remained in the background and are not always involved in the operational management of cooperative peacekeeping missions. More specific coordination tasks are often delegated to international contact groups or direct contacts between officials. All three case studies saw the establishment of international contact groups; in the case of Somalia even two – one for piracy and
one for mainland Somalia – have been set up. In contrast to permanent interinstitutional ties, contact groups are temporary with sporadic meetings and partly fluctuating participation. Some of the contact groups are expansive, comprising more than 80 different actors including major IOs and single countries such as the contact group on piracy in Somalia. Despite the proliferation of joint meetings, decision making remains individual. However, the existing permanent and temporary inter-institutional linkages provide the opportunity for close coordination of positions. This, however, does not automatically mean actors are progressively converging. So far the different peacekeeping doctrines between the AU, EU and UN have not significantly narrowed due to more institutionalised contact. However, these frequent contacts provide better opportunities for coordination. Chapters 13, 14 and 15 present three mission case studies exemplifying the degree of inter-connectedness in modern peacekeeping by exploring IO interaction over conflicts in Somalia, the CAR and Mali, covering Eastern, Central and Western Africa. While all three cases have in common that they are important examples of cooperative multi-actor peacekeeping, establishing a country-specific regime complex, they do vary in the exact form of coordination and speed of cooperation. Still, all three cases primarily use two distinct forms of peacekeeping – sequential and parallel deployments – but to varying extents. Actor constellations in cooperative peacekeeping are not static but change over time and are only temporary, responding to conflict dynamics on the ground. In Somalia the international community developed its support for peacekeeping around the deployment of operation AMISOM of the AU. The EU and UN deployed smaller support missions while the AU carried the greatest share with meanwhile more than 20,000 troops deployed to the country. While a UN takeover is envisioned it is not likely to materialise as long as AMISOM is forced to engage in peace enforcement, actively fighting Al-Shabaab. Thus, the Somali case is dominated by a parallel deployment and division of labour. While the AU engages in peace enforcement, the EU provides funding and training capabilities and the UN covers more civilian peacekeeping tasks. The issue of piracy has been treated separately from land-based peacekeeping, again parallel deployment of naval operations has been the first choice of the international community. In the case of the CAR we observed 11 peacekeeping missions by seven different IOs and one by France. The dominant mode of cooperative peacekeeping was sequential. For almost two decades missions were handed over from one actor to another. Only recently with the humanitarian and political crisis in the country being aggravated significantly have we been able to observe a tendency towards more parallel deployments, mostly due to capacity shortcomings of the individual actors. Finally, in Mali we were able to observe the rapid succession of peacekeeping actors initiated by the French military intervention working as a trigger for the deployment of an African mission that was quickly transferred to the UN.
