ABSTRACT
This chapter examines whether Mussolini, who was not unaware of these deficiencies, ever made a serious effort to detach his country from the rush towards disaster which was so clearly looming in 1942-43. Fascist Italy should have been at an obvious advantage in June 1940, with France traumatised by the German blitzkrieg and Britain expecting an invasion at any moment and without the heavy equipment left on the beaches of Dunkirk. Yet those advantages were frittered away by Mussolini and his military leaders, especially in Africa. Mussolini had entered the war against France and Britain to obtain cheap glory, but he was unable to deal adequately with the very small French forces along the common border. Early raids by the British into Italian Libya also found the Duce's forces unprepared, and Marshal Graziani was extremely reluctant to launch the offensive into Egypt which Mussolini wanted.
