ABSTRACT
The scholarly attempts to formulate that shared conception have been largely based on the authors' diverse conceptions of Bakhtin's own work that serves as its conceptual matrix. For Bakhtin, this role is played by the deed a concept on which people elaborate. People argues that Bakhtin's focus on the concrete, the personal, and the relational rather than the systemic is where he parts company with the neo-Kantians and this is probably the most significant and innovative aspect of his philosophical project. Thus, rather than a continuation of the neo-Kantian philosophical tradition, Bakhtin's work seems to offer a break from it, in as much as it develops a phenomenological approach to subjectivity, predicated on the boundary between self and other, the asymmetry of perspectives, and the irreducible singularity of the subjective context. Thinkers who shared Bakhtin's emphasis on concrete first-person experience, most notably Georg Simmel, concludes that such experience must be ineffable, because language cannot express it.
