ABSTRACT
Introspection is essential to the study of subjective experience but is problematic. Some call for a special ‘first-person science’ of consciousness based on irreducible subjective facts; others claim that ‘first-person methods’ such as introspection, meditation, or other personal explorations and training are valid, but science is a collective enterprise and a science of consciousness is no different. The former tend to believe in the validity of the hard problem and the possibility of zombies; the latter do not. We review the methods of traditional phenomenology: the epoché and phenomenological reduction. Neurophenomenology aims to unite modern cognitive science with a disciplined approach to subjective experience, with experiments relating brain imaging to (for example) experiences of time or ‘the structure of nowness’. Velmans’s theory of ‘non-reductive reflexive monism’ claims to do away with the first-/third-person distinction, although it faces many criticisms. Experiments such as the ‘body-swap illusion’ bring ‘second-person’ or social neuroscience into play, involving new methods with trained interviewers. Finally, Dennett’s heterophenomenology advocates adopting a neutral stance towards people’s descriptions of subjective experience, much like an anthropologist studying other cultures’ fictions. Working with the personal practices offered throughout this book may help you evaluate these theories and your own experiences.
