Summary and Conclusions | 14 | Islam, Context, Pluralism and Democracy

ABSTRACT

In this chapter, I summarize the main research points of this book and provide general conclusions. This study examined the diachrony of some classical and modern Muslim interpretations with regard to the concepts of development, pluralism and democracy based on Arabic-Islamic sources and literature. Focusing on the parameters of semantic changes, methods of interpretation and cultural variables, it showed how this interpretive tradition oﬀers a diversity of ideas and approaches that are decisive in any discussion of the compatibility of Islam with these concepts today. Based on the analysis of core Islamic texts and key terms related to the discussed issues, mainly from the Quran and the Sunnah and the broader Arabic-Islamic literature, I explored the boundaries of the mutable and immutable in the Islamic worldview. This occurred in the context of the linguistic and cultural variables that determine the tensions between the historically remote texts and the contemporary diachronic challenges. Generic Islamic values could be emphasized to deal with such challenges. As stated in Chapter 1, “Introduction,” European colonization exposed

indoor Islamic culture to a new cultural model, and the interaction became direct and inﬂuential as never before. A traditional Islamic worldview, inspired by the divine revelation, now juxtaposes a developed and “superior” civilizational model based on the separation between Church and State. Today, the civilizational stagnation of the majority of Muslim countries and the enormity of the imposed cultural challenge made it a historically crucial moment for the Muslim world. The emergence of many Islamic socio-political reformative projects highlighted twomain challenges that face any modern Islamic reform: secularism and contextualization. Both challenges characterize the controversial theme of the proper role of “religion” in any modern context. The formula in which these challenges become salient in Muslim intellectualism has always been linked to a developed pluralistic and democratic Western model. Hence, the notions of development, pluralism and democracy form the central civilizational and socio-political aspects of this challenge. Islamic traditionalism remained a dynamic denominator in this formula. This means that the concepts of reform, revival, modernism and innovation remain, in the main stream of Muslim intellectualism, remarkably devoted to the Islamic scriptural sources. However,

the Islamic tradition has historically produced a great diversity, on diﬀerent levels, of its epistemological, theological, socio-cultural and political manifestations. Language and the holy text with its interpretations, as crucial factors in the diachronic dynamism of a religious tradition, form the elixir of the Islamic tradition. They also determine the boundaries of changeability and contextualization in diﬀerent spatiotemporal contexts. Therefore, in Chapter 2, “TheDilemma of aDiachronic Language,” I discussed

the dilemma of language and religion, in general, and of Arabic and Islam, in particular. Language is a precondition of religion. Through it, a religious tradition emerges, evolves and knows its diversity. I based my discussion of the relation between religion and language on a hypothesis that a religious text has to do with three phases of linguistic evolution. The ﬁrst is the “pre-existent,” which acts as the code in which the divine Word is revealed. The second is the “communicative,” with the mediation of a Messenger, where a new spectrum of language emerges and dominates through the holiness of the divine text. The third is the “diachronic,” which involves the semantic changes in language and its adaptability to the historical and cultural parameters; and here a methodological tradition of interpretation is generated, with parallel levels of readings and understandings. A religious language emerges as a new code for the decryption of the divine message to humankind. Within the realm of this code the human mind faces two levels of semantic knowledge: the superﬁcial-linguistic (human) knowledge and the quintessential-religious (divine) knowledge. Through this cognitional process, a religious culture and tradition evolves, expands and divaricates. As religion employs language, language employs religion. This is because we actually learn a new extra-language, diﬀerent in vocabulary, syntax and semantics, in order to confess and proclaim our religious faith, to pray and to supplicate to God. The long-term linguistic diachrony, when linguistic shifts are more salient, plays a signiﬁcant role in the formation of a religious culture. The remoteness of the extra-language of the texts makes the gap between the superﬁcial/linguistic and the quintessential/religious greater. Both the High and the Low Islamic cultures are manifestations of the scriptural and popular spectra of these linguistic levels. Without the proper knowledge of these linguistic peculiarities, an understanding of the diﬀerent aspects of a religious tradition is impossible. In the case of Islam and the Arabic language, we saw that the text of the

Quran homogenized the Arabic dialects and gave birth to the whole epistemological development of Arabic linguistics and its literature. Through this divine revelation, the Arabic language became ethno-decentralized or, rather, Islamized. Beyond the ritual manifestations, the relation between Islam and Arabic remains inextricably essential through the authority of a scriptural extra-language, which is always conceived of as a safeguard of the purity, credibility and authenticity of any approach to the scriptural sources of Islam. The Quranic sciences, with tafsı-r as an utmost end, emerged promptly in the Muslim tradition to safeguard the invariable Divine Word from the hyperbolic variability of human language. The tafsı-r methodology produced a

hierarchical authority for the Quranic exegesis, which touches heavily on the traditional sources of knowledge (athar/riwa-ya). However, a new school of independent human reasoning (ra’y/dira-ya) emerged as a result of the stormy philosophical impact of a new cultural world. This tafsı-r is seen as less trustful and sometimes baseless, as it loads the text with meanings and hermeneutical connotations which the ﬁrst receivers did not recognize or narrate. Nevertheless, the reported traditions did not cover all the Quranic exegetic ﬁelds. Thus, the control of the free role of human intellect in the interpretation of the Quran did not imply its complete refusal. Rather, it routed this human reasoning in a traditional path and preconditioned it to be in accordance with the Quran, the Sunnah and the Arabic language. This trend of tafsı-r also developed on the popular sphere forming what we know as popular religion. Here the Arabic language plays a crucial role, with its two variants of High (H = fus.h.a) and Low (L = ‘a-mmiyya) Arabic. Adding the Extra language (E) of the scriptural sources, we face diﬀerent exegetic levels that correspond to variant linguistic levels. The interpretation of the Quran by the Quran, by the Prophetic Sunnah or the companions, relates to the E level, while that of the followers and their followers varies between E and H, and that of personal opinion varies between H and L; ﬁnally, the tafsı-r in the realm of popular religion touches mainly on the L level of Arabic. Accordingly, Gellner’s well-known classiﬁcation of Islamic culture corresponds to the same linguistic parameters; the High culture to E and H, and the Low to L with its regional variations. Thus, the diachronic variations of Arabic language produced great diversity within the Muslim culture. It also still provides it with hermeneutic readings, even of the most established classical interpretations. In light of this diversity, the question about which version of Islamic culture

can represent Islam today becomes legitimate. In fact, any access to Islam through any of its socio-political, economic, cultural and ethnic variables should be linked to this speciﬁc variable, and remain comparable to other cases within the Islamic experience. This includes a variety of interpretations, fatwa’s, ﬁqh schools and Quranic exegesis works through the long history of Islam. In this respect a great room for human reasoning remains open in Islamic intellectualism, as long as it is faithful to the scriptural norms and maintains its methodological relation with the classical Islamic tradition. The role of ijtiha-d in Islam is conﬁned by the margins of a mutable ﬁqh and an immutable Sharia. Sharia is invariable in its textuality while ﬁqh is variable in its intellectuality. The tension between ijtiha-d and taqlı-d (imitation, traditionalism) determines the limits of developing new interpretive and jurisprudential views related to the changeable contexts. This is because the authority of human intellect (‘aql) does not contradict the revelation (naql) in Islam. The revelation gave many totalities (kolliya-t) in diﬀerent ﬁelds of life but left the door of ijtiha-d open with regard to changeable sub-issues (furu-‘), especially in the absence of a clear text vis-à-vis the developing context. In Chapter 3, “Classical Sources and Interpretations about Development,”

I examined the Islamic concept of development and the limits of innovation,

modernization and reform in a Muslim context. In the overall Islamic worldview, development is a mundane norm that characterizes creation. Religion itself is a telling example, as the succession of divine revelations came in consecutive analogy with the development of human status. The survey of the Quranic discourse concerning the evolution of humanity, and the gradual revelation and assignment of obligations and legislation during a period of 23 years all show that development and change of context are highly considered in Islam. Moreover, both the scriptural and jurisprudential fundamentals of the idea of progress are clear incentives in the quest for a better option in the mundane context, as long as it does not contradict the tenets of Islamic faith. The Quran constantly urges Muslims to contemplate and judge right from wrong. This entails the need to scrutinize the past, seek the best choices in the present and consider every possible social and individual future interest. All this remains within the boundaries of Islamic rules concerning what is mas.lah.a (interest/advantage) and what is mafsada (harm/ disadvantage). To evaluate these boundaries, Muslim classical jurists, such as Al-Shatibi and Al-Ghazali, determined the appropriateness of any relevant new issue in light of the objectives of Sharia – that is, to safeguard for humans their lives, religion, intellect, lineage and property. Accordingly, Muslim classical traditions show that wisdom, wherever it comes from, is the goal of the believer, and that every legitimate ijtiha-d perceived as good by the ummah andwhich meets its consent is also good for God. This is what happened, for example, in the development of the concept of khila-fa, in the absence of a clear designation of the Prophet for his successor. In this respect, Muslims have a great margin of neutrality (iba-h.a) where every good human achievement and modernization could be incorporated and adopted, even from other contexts. The jurisprudential rule of istih. sa-n (ﬁnding something good/better; appropriateness) is to be activated in every contingent issue that Muslims have to face in a developing and changing world. The nexus between religious belief and scientiﬁc-epistemological mundane developments was the main feature of the periods of civilizational excellence in Islamic history. During this time, Al-Khwarizmi invented the science of algebra to solve mathematical problems related to the Islamic law of inheritance, as well as other ﬁqh issues. If Muslims today seek the way of civilizational and cultural renaissance, they should ﬁrst renovate their conceptualization of a core value of religion: the relation between the unseen world and the seen one. Today Islamic reform should utilize any appropriate global “wisdom” and “value,” as long as it is does not contradict Islamic fundamentals. Islamic modalities toward the Pre-Islamic culture of ja-hiliyya provide a

telling example of how Islam was open to every good human value even when it came from its most antagonistic context. Islam, partially or fully incorporated, perfected, reﬁned or rationalized the ethical code of Pre-Islamic society in a deliberate process of spiritual detribalization. This happened through re-routing the virtues of this society and Islamizing the Arab moral code that responds to the human ﬁt.ra (divinely inherent human nature). What was valid

for the Pre-Islamic context remains valid for Post-Islamic contexts. As the Prophetic tradition teaches, “I have been sent to perfect the best of ethics”; this should be the norm for every human value in the diachrony of every Islamic reform. This led the discussion to the notion of “perfection” of the religion of Islam, which directs the Muslim discourse on the holistic nature of the last divine revelation, the “Islamic solution” and its validity to every time and place. The rigorous linguistic diﬀerence between the terms s.a-lih. and mus.lih. implies a distinction between two Muslim views on the concept of perfection and its relation to the variability of contexts. The ﬁrst focuses more on the revivalism of the successful “righteous” model of the ﬁrst generations of Islam. The “Islam,” which mended this “archetype” model, would surely mend any Muslim context. The second, not less faithful to the same model, underscores the “dynamism” that characterizes the Islamic socio-political system and its perpetual interaction with the developing world. The concept of perfection is embodied in the mitigation and ease given for Muslims in ritual and legislative rulings; it should, however, be crystallized in the compatibility and consistency of Islam with developing and changing human status. It is logical to conclude that He Who did not lay any hardship upon Muslims in issues of religion did not lay it upon them in worldly issues by the prescription of one detailed socio-political model. A modern example of the idea of perfection was given in the controversial

view of the socio-political exegete and theorist S. Qutb. He argued that religion in Islam (dı-n), an indivisible whole in a Sharia-dı-n parity, is a maximal system for all the features and aspects of human life. The sovereignty of God (h.a-kimiyya) is not to be substituted by any human sovereignty in the systematization of human life. Nonetheless, the review and discussion of some other passages from his works showed how he recognizes the ﬂexibility of many diachronic and “renewed” Islamic images that can all be described as “Islamic” as long as they respond to the total Islamic view. Afterwards, I examined the relevance of the central concept of bid‘a to the issue of renovation. Based on the discussion of classical literature, we could see how it entails invention in something related to the legislative corpus of religion, especially in the ﬁelds of creed (‘aqı-da) and ritual actions. Scholars such as Al-Shatibi and Ibn Abdelsalam considered some achievements of the civilization and culture of their own time as examples of those innovations, outside the Islamic concept of bid‘a (novelty/heterodoxy). The outcome of the exploration of the notions of the “diachronic validity” and the “perfection” of Islam leads to the conclusion that the diﬀerent approaches can be theoretically reconciled. These approaches can agree on the fact that Islam is valid (s.a-lih. ) for every time and place through its reformative power of ijtiha-d to validate/mend (yus.lih. ) the context of this time and place. This happens when Muslims reach practical and viable solutions for demanding questions, just as earlier generations of Muslims did in their own time. Islamic reform is always a production of a tangled combination of tradition

and modernism, where tradition itself is inherently reinterpretable within the

margins of all that can be subject to ijtiha-d. These margins are vastly conﬁned in Islam so that the “revealed” can always maintain its validity and contemporaneity for the “lived.” Thus, Islamic reform is a process that emerges from within and for Islam, but it is not a reform of Islam. It is the theory and procedure which proposes a redeﬁnition of a certain Islamic approach to the challenges of modernity within the framework of Islamic deductive methods. This implies that the notion of tajdı-d (renovation) does not involve the immutable aspects of “religion,” but rather the mutable human status in interaction with divine guidance, in the area of the “no-text” or that of the speculative texts (nus.u-s. z.anniyya). In this Muslim view of reform, modernity is not essentially regarded in terms of revolutionary contention with tradition. Rather, it reactivates the dynamic aspects of this tradition that guarantee its consistency with the prerequisites of development and modernization. That the result would be diﬀerent from the Western model of modernity is certain, but here we need to be reminded of the need to think of diﬀerent paths to “modernity” or “multiple modernities.” However, to utilize the renovation of “religion” only as a spiritual defensive process against the invasion of a socalled “Western material positivism” is something that contributes to the civilizational stagnation of the Muslim world. The fear of the extreme dominance of materialism, rationalism and positivism should not be confronted by another extreme dominance of spiritualism and mysticism at the expense of the role of intellect and science in Islam. The Islamic golden principle of wasat.iyya (centrism) should be present in any Islamic reform, and the notion of tajdı-d al-dı-n (renovation of religion) should not be conceptualized apart from reform of this worldly life (tajdı-d al-dunia). Surprisingly, one ﬁnds great reformative readings, even more progressive than modern and contemporary ones, among Muslim classical scholars which need to be revived today. When Al-Shatibi stated in the 14th century that “rules diﬀer by diﬀering habits and circumstances,” this did not imply a variation in the original Islamic rules. It meant, rather, that if these circumstances change, each should be attributed to a legislative principle that ﬁts in its particular case, considering the common unrestricted interests (mas.a-lih. mursala). Here, a great room exists for contextualization within the realm of tradition. In Chapter 4, “On Pluralism,” I focused on the Islamic concept of pluralism

as a modern hermeneutic practical model of the Muslim interpretive diversity, a socio-political and cultural challenge and a premise for the discussion of the theme of Islam and democracy. An Islamic political project is criticized because of its incompatibility with modern pluralistic views, something which impairs its democratic claims. Therefore, beginning with an analysis of the Arabic term for pluralism (ta‘addudiyya), I clariﬁed that it is used in a broader sense than just “religious pluralism.” It denotes the inclusive interaction between Islam and all the diversity and “otherness” that exists outside it, including a wide array of religious, socio-cultural and political aspects. I also concluded that Hick’s hypothesis of pluralism cannot be in harmony with ta‘addudiyya, as it works in one direction from the human towards the Divine,

and overlooks the role of “the” Real and His scriptural messages in the revelation of His name, attributes and law. To neutralize the diﬀerences between worldviews and religions, especially in issues of creed, in the name of pluralism, belongs more to a fanciful philosophical idealism than practical reality. In fact, the term ta‘addudiyya is neither to be encountered in Islamic sources nor even in classical Muslim literature. The Islamic tradition knows the term ikhtila-f (dissimilarity, diﬀerence, variation, diversity). This diversity is approached as a divine norm which characterizes God’s creation as a whole. The Muslim view of pluralism emerges mainly from the concept of tawh. ı-d (uniﬁcation of God). God’s Oneness and Invariability are manifested in contradiction with the plurality and variation of His creation. The Quranic structure of the idea of ikhtila-f begins from the One and Only God, to the creation of one father and mother of humankind, to the expansion of humankind into one nation on ﬁt.ra, to the variation and plurality of all aspects of this creation, including humans. The Oneness of God at the top of all this existence is the common reference. The more we are inspired by the higher Unity of our existence, the more we become aware of our diversity in pluralistic terms. All humans, though not brothers in religion, are linked by the bond of brotherhood in humanity. However, Islamic pluralism does not involve religious relativism, as it recognizes doctrinal and ritual particularities. At the same time, the Islamic view is not entirely exclusive with regard to other worldviews. It recognizes a divine will and wisdom behind the existence of “otherness” in this world. It acknowledges a “human diversity in unity,” not only in the ﬁeld of religious beliefs, but in all facets of life. This unity is related to the universality of Islam, and its global linguistic meaning as a “submission” to the One and Only God. In this sense, this “Islam” was the universal Message of all messengers, who succeeded each other in a continuum of revelations from the same source with the same core message. I concluded that the concept of pluralism in Islam is not comparable to inclusive or exclusive assumptions, as these terms are established in Western philosophy of religion. Because it does not conditionally involve the ideas of “salvation” and “truth” about the Divine in the conceptualization of its view of ta‘addudiyya, Islamic pluralism is less about the question what to do about our belief, and more about what to do beyond our belief ? Therefore, the Islamic terms ta‘addudiyya and ikhtila-f have more relevance to the concept of diversity than that of religious pluralism. Generally, an Islamic pluralistic worldview recognizes diversity and diﬀerences and seeks to ﬁnd ways to handle them compromisingly. To put this theoretical perspective in a practical framework, I developed the

discussion to cover the relation between Islam and the “Other.” A survey of the ﬁrst encounter with the People of the Book showed how Islam deﬁned itself clearly within the line of the Abrahamic religious tradition through a series of scriptural and practical modes. The relation between this new faith and the already established scriptural tradition in the Arabian Peninsula took diﬀerent forms, according to the socio-political and economic conditions of

the era. Christian hermits are narrated to foretell and acknowledge the prophethood of Muhammad, while the Christian King Negus secured asylum for the ﬁrst Muslim immigrants to Abyssinia. In the case of the Jews, as a cohesive and prosperous religious group with its own worries and discomfort for the rise of a new promising political power lead by an “Abrahamic Prophet,” political frictions were inevitable. The geopolitical particularity of the Arabian Peninsula should be seriously considered in the discussion of the encounter between an emerging rival Islamic “alternative” and all the surrounding cohesive religious, social and economic-political “otherness.” However, though antagonism is not established in the Quran as a reference code for the behavioral encounter with any religious “Other,” an interpretive tradition provided more controversies to this issue. Based on a claim of “abrogation” (naskh), most of the pro-tolerance Quranic verses which prompt kindness and peaceful dealing with the “Other” become deactivated through other later anti-tolerance verses. “The Sword Verse” (a-yat al-sayf; 9:5) remained the reference point in this respect. Our discussion of relevant examples from the Quran and the exegetic tradition came to diﬀerent conclusions. I explained how a long exegetic tradition provided extreme, if not fatal, exaggerations in the ﬁeld of the rapport between Islam and the “Others.” Nevertheless, other prominent classical exegetes, such as Al-Tabari and Ibn Kathir, dismiss the abrogation claims and support the undisputed validity of the pro-tolerant verses. Therefore, the claimed verses are unequivocally not abrogated (muh.kama). These verses comprise an ethical norm which regulates the relation between Muslims and the “Other” in terms of tolerance and rapprochement. Strikingly, terms such as dhimmi and ka-ﬁr persisted in the discourse on

Islamic pluralism as exclusive characterizations of non-Muslims. Therefore, it was necessary to analyze the semantics and hermeneutic implementations in the Islamic theological and jurisprudential domains. The word dhimma indicates semantically a pact of protective care, guardianship and looking after someone (or something), who has an inviolable right. Technically, as it occurs in the Quran, the term refers to a pact or a covenant to safeguard something entrusted. This term also has some connotations with self-conscious commitment to voluntarily fulﬁll this entrustment even without a written warranty. Consequently, dhimmis (ahl al-dhimma = people of dhimma) are those nonMuslim, especially Christians and Jews, who by a pact of God, His Messenger and the Muslims should be protected and secured within the realm of any Islamic authority. In that historical context, dhimma was a sort of a status of citizenship. This status involved rights of protection and security but also obligations toward the Muslim state. This constitutes a common approach in almost all the debates of modern and contemporary Muslim intelligentsia and jurists. The constitutional agreement in Medina (622) aimed at the establishment of a political entity based on the principle of citizenship and city-state federal strategies. In Muslim eyes, enthusiastically, this document constituted a Social Contract more than 1,000 years before Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau. The political utilization of this Muslim enthusiasm always serves as a religious

impetus toward pluralistic values, to be inspired and embodied in modern political contexts. Moreover, the survey of some classical Muslim jurists, such as Ibn Hazm, Al-Qaraﬁ and Ibn Taymiya, clariﬁed how the term was used in their literature as relevant to core pluralistic values. It is very important to consider the linguistic semantics of such Islamic terms and their diachrony when we approach them in modern contexts, as they historically became charged with social, political and cultural elements. Today, the issue is to be approached in the context of a modern “Islamic” state which is based on the principle of citizenship. However, Islamic religious values and ethics of diﬀerence and otherness (ikhtila-f) can contribute eﬀectively and signiﬁcantly to modern pluralistic and democratic constitutionalization in the Muslim world. In this respect, dhimma, though irrelevant to the current context, is to be conceptualized as a covenant, pact and duty on Muslims and not as a status of religious discrimination for Muslims against non-Muslims. As far as the word ka-ﬁr is concerned, it is always used in terms of non-

pluralistic discrimination. Linguistically, ka-ﬁr (a present active participle from the verb k-f-r) is someone or something who/which “covers.” A farmer is a ka-ﬁr “coverer,” as we also read in the Quran (57:20), because he puts seeds in earth and covers them with soil. Technically, the religious meaning of kofr (unbelief) stands as the corollary opposite of ı-ma-n (faith, belief), just as to believe in something is to disbelieve in another. Even a Muslim should disbelieve (yakfor) in other forms and tenets of faith in order to be a believer (mu’min); the same applies for a non-Muslim who disbelieves in Islam and believes in his own faith as true. A ka-ﬁr, in the religious sense, is he who covers, or whose heart is covered from, the truth sent by God or any part of it, and acts as if it does not exist. I concluded, then, that the term ka-ﬁr is related to the soteriological and theological tenets of every religion. On the basis of faith, Islam strictly regards the “covering” of the God-sent truth, partially or wholly, as kofr, and in this regard people are “believers” or “unbelievers.” But, on the basis of humanity, people are all equal humans and their diﬀerences do not justify treating them unjustly. People for a Muslim, as Imam Ali is reported to have said, are of two kinds: “a brother in religion or a counterpart in humanity.” When we turn to the Muslim religious and cultural identity we see that reli-

gious identity, what I term as “Muslimness,” is a salient common denominator in the self-deﬁnition of average Muslims. Islam (submission) requires a wholehearted and maximal commitment to the divine guidance in a quest for success in this world and the Hereafter. The Quran (2:208; 49:14) diﬀerentiates between Ima-n (belief/faith), Islam (submission) and “Islam” as a label. Believed by all Muslims to be the directly spoken Word of God, the Quran plays an intrinsic pedagogic and educational role in the formation of the individual and collective identity of Muslims. Similarly, the Sunnah of the Prophet, embodied in his teachings, ethics and even some physical characteristics, makes him the paradigmatic archetype (’uswa) of “Muslimness.” Ritually, the ﬁve pillars, including the acts of devotion (‘iba-da-t), are cumulatively structured to guarantee a Muslim who is constantly aware of his religious identity, on daily, weekly, yearly and

lifetime bases. Also, with an intense reference to the Hereafter, a Muslim is ordered to live his mortality properly with an eye on his proper immortality. I concluded how this “Muslimness” determines sociologically not only his self-consciousness, but also his belonging to a certain group; the in-group in comparison with the out-group, and his intergroup behavioral code, as he sees things from his Muslim-group perspective. In the context of “otherness,” this identity should not indoctrinate monocultural attitudes. However, “Muslimness” becomes salient in some situations, as it refers to an Islam-centric identity which characterizes a Muslim and determines his behavior in various contexts. This “Muslimness” in the cultural domain of identity presents great diversity. The intra-Islamic cultural diversity provided a great mosaic of multiculturalism early in Islamic history. Both sectarian and doctrinal diﬀerences were exhibited as divergences from the pivotal religious example of the Prophet. Cultural diversity is considered even in the Islamic scriptural methodology, as in the case of the isra-’ı-liyya-t in tafsı-r, or the assessment of the criterion of uprightness (‘ada-la) of the narrators in hadith. This also applies lucidly in the ﬁqh tradition where regional custom (‘urf) is highly considered in the validity of legal norms. Muslim culture is what a Muslim carries, along with his Muslimness; it comprises ethnic, linguistic, social and doctrinal characteristics that distinguish him not only from non-Muslims but also from other Muslims. I concluded from this intra-Islamic diversity that Islam, both as a religion and a civilization, is inherently multicultural. The success of Islamic classical civilization lies in the reconciliation between what is religiously obligatory and what is culturally proﬁtable. This is possible when Muslims know how to preserve a religious identity which perceives the diversity in every mundane being and reconciles with it as long as the tenets of faith are guaranteed. Focusing on the status quo of a multicultural globalized society, I examined

the Muslim disquietude with globalization, which is to be attributed mainly to cultural worries. This disquietude emerges basically from two main factors. Firstly, most Muslims cherish Islamic civilization and culture, with reference to its characteristic universality (‘a-lamiyya), as a signiﬁcant constituent component in human history. Secondly, there is a presumption of a cultural opponent behind globalization, as it entails a materialist and anti-religious trend. However, this phenomenon of cultural protectiveness is also active on an intra-Islamic level, as in the case between the Sunni and the Shiite doctrines, or even more on a Sunni-Sunni level. This protectiveness cannot justify isolation from a global machine of civilizational and cultural progress. Any Islamic reform and enhancement of Muslim cultural identity does not merit remaining outside the historical moment and its implications, especially when it claims a validity of Islam to every spatiotemporal context. The very internal cultural developments of Muslim societies are liable to the same religious rules applied in the case of external developments – namely, those of unrestricted interests (mas.a-lih. mursala) and balanced centrism (wasat.iyya) – in considering “Muslimness” as a qualiﬁcation for success in the Here, as for the Hereafter. Extending this discussion to Muslim existence in a Western secular context,

we have to admit that in some cases Muslims in the West enjoy rights and religious freedoms that they lack in their countries of origin. But it is a fact that the relation between Muslim minorities and the state in the West, especially in the aftermath of September 11, 2001, is somehow formed within and under the pressure of a “culture of fear.” On the one hand, it still lacks objectivity and political transparency, and is mainly formulated in limited terms of public security, cultural antagonism and integration strategies. On the other, Muslims still miss a recognized and common religious reference, due to their intraIslamic diversity and the sporadic role local imams and scholars can play in this regard. I concluded that the proper integration of the Muslim communities in the West should follow a threefold strategy. Firstly, state policy should involve Muslims in the common good of “their” Western societies through eliminating the feeling that “Muslimness” is at odds with “high citizenship”; it should also promote a Western-Muslim scholarship. Secondly, the Muslim ‘ulama-’ within the Muslim world should develop new trends in the ﬁqh of minorities (aqalliyya-t). It should go beyond the protection of religious identity and fatwa’s regulations to focus on the pressing global problems and cultural questions that face Muslims in the West. Thirdly, Western Muslims, through positive involvement and active participation in common aﬀairs, can overcome the integration-versus-identity syndrome. The example of the socio-politically successful “less Muslim” Muslim and the “turncoat” Muslima in the West will collapse when the alternative of an exemplary combination of Muslimness and Western citizenship requirements is achieved. In Chapter 5, “On Democracy,” the controversial issue of Islam and

democracy was analyzed. As an a priori approach we should be reminded that here we cannot compare a religion with a political system. Therefore, I investigated some key classical and modern ideas in the Islamic interpretive discourse to reconstruct a Muslim reﬂection on democracy. Beginning with the discussion of the issue of religion and politics in Islam, I attempted to show how both the scriptural and historical contexts, underpinned by a reasonable interpretive legacy, support a view that Islam tackles the issue of power and governance in generic but core terms. The sub-issues and the details of application were left to human reasoning in the proper context, as long as this happens in conformity with the objectives of Islamic legislation. One can thus speak of political views in Islam, rather than a “political Islam.” This guarantees a space for core democratic values simply because there is no particular political system of rule in Islam, but a rigorous system for the ethics of governance and statecraft according to Islam. Furthermore, I analyzed some key political terms related to the notion of

state in Islam. The ﬁrst is the concept ummah, which, as a reference point in the Islamic political discourse, provides the notion of state with transnational connotations. Nevertheless, this concept, in its political sense, is not restricted to the “Muslim community of believers.” As it developed in Muslim political history, it circumscribed a political entity which gathers Muslims and nonMuslims. As far as its transnational implications are concerned, the ummah

political model represents a Muslim aspiration to an era of civilizational supremacy, political autonomy, justice and prosperity more than a hegemonic ambition. It reached its status quo as the “religious” entity which trespasses the geopolitical barricades and nationalistic failures through a spiritual and universal bond between all Muslims. The second concept is that of theocracy, or h.a-kimiyya (sovereignty of God) in the Muslim literature. Analyzing the scriptural and jurisprudential background of this concept, we ﬁnd clearly that no authority in Islam can claim to rule in the name of God. The category of ‘ulama-’ has no prestigious political role or involvement unless the relevant expertise and qualiﬁcations are available. In Islam, as in a democracy, the ummah (here “the people”) is the source of political authority. We cannot speak about an “Islamic government,” but rather about an “Islamic philosophy of governance,” while every statecraft which can realize and incorporate the goals of Islamic legislation can be politically considered as “Islamic.” The modern Muslim discourse on democracy is loaded with some classical

prototypes, as “collective representations,” which aﬀect the conceptualization of the ideal political leadership. The relation between the ruler and the ruled (ra-‘ı-and ra‘iyya), based on the value of justice (‘adl), ﬁnds reference in the prototype of the Prophetic and Caliphate periods. The Caliphate on the Prophetic Way has its privilege as a continuum of the ideal Prophetic state, and distinguishes itself from the following “monarchical” dynasties. Omar, the second Caliph (634-644), in particular, maintained a special position as the archetype of the just ruler (ima-m ‘a-dil). His name would be enthusiastically recalled and linked to situations and processes related to democratic values, such as shu-ra consultative councils, institutional reform, women and minority rights, and social solidarity. Such Islamic prototypes pervade the Muslim political discourse as competitive and self-suﬃcient in comparison with “Other” models because they couple the religiously pious and the worldly successful in one model. The adherence to such prototypes, not essentially opponent to democracy, may suggest a democratic political formula where religion is a normative ethical incentive. However, it still has its echoes in the anti-democratic argumentations of some Muslim streams. The value of ‘adl does not only grant an Islamic political project a feeling of autonomy and self-suﬃciency; it also promotes an argument of uniqueness. This iustitia Islamica proposes itself as a divinely guided guarantee of the human common good. The “power of justice” (‘adlkratia) persists in this discourse, challenging the “power of the people” (de-mokratı-a). A question which arises is whether these political models and values are

not obtainable within a democratic system. To answer it I analyzed some core aspects of the Muslim classical political thought, embodied in the so-called sia-ysa shar‘iyya (Sharia-oriented politics). First of all we have to be aware of the historical context, the circumstances and motives behind the development of most works in this ﬁeld. Sometimes it was the desire of the ruler-Caliph himself or the critical historical moment for the ummah which motivated the authors, such as Al-Mawardi, Al-Ghazali and Ibn Taymiya. Islamic religious

politics emerged initially in Kala-m as scholastic argumentations on ima-ma to justify the Caliphate theory against the Shiite denial (rafd. ), and developed as a ﬁqh branch in responsive methods to critical historical contexts of great upheavals, and sectarian and cultural antagonism. Absent the term “democracy” in this classical literature, the notion of ‘adl was maintained in the Muslim political thought as the spirit which permeates all the aspects of the relation ruler-ruled. Nevertheless, this classical Muslim political thought can still present overlaps and contradictions, not only with democracy, but also with the very idea of ‘adl. Though the right of the people in the choice of political authorities is clearly established in Islamic tradition, sia-ysa shar‘iyya has produced some contradictory views. According to these views, revolutionary opposition against oppressive predominant dictators has long been declared by some scholars as an act of transgression (baghı-y) and source of turmoil (ﬁtna). In this respect, the development of modern trends in Muslim political jurisprudence in the context of democratization is a must in order to determine the primary objectives behind the establishment of a democratic state inspired by Islamic values. This must be feasible because, at the crucial democratic point of power relations, Islamic principles are pro-democratic. The label “democratic” is not as signiﬁcant as the core values it guarantees. Accordingly, Islamic history has enough political morals to teach Muslims that the label “Islamic” is not really what Islam cares about. If the model of a Muslim just ruler on the traits of a Rightly Guided Caliph can hardly, if not improbably, be found today, perhaps a “Rightly Guided Democracy” is possible. Such a democracy can guarantee global democratic values that are welcomed in Islam, and promote the ethics of Islamic political thought to achieve legitimacy in any Muslim context. Speaking of democratic legitimacy, we should discuss the Muslim reservation

concerning Western democracy. A basic problem in this regard is that of the margins of freedom and the challenge of liberal democracy. Though the contested nature of the concept of “freedom,” there is no such absolute individual freedom unrestricted inwardly by self-control or outwardly by a public authority. The relativity of the boundaries of authority, inwardly or outwardly, determines the deﬁnition of freedom. Muslim approaches to the notion of freedom reinforce a balance between the right of choice and the duty of responsibility, within a broader societal context bound by legislative, cultural and moral norms. Freedom (h.urriya), in the Islamic view, is a divine trust (ama-na), which the ﬁrst man accepted to act volitionally in this worldly life. This entailed a divine declaration (baya-n), a guidance (huda-) and an admonition (maw‘iz.a) for humankind to route this volition in the right path. Faith is, thus, what makes a Muslim free to “submit” and free through “submission” to nothing and none other than God, as an experience which redirects freedom to be in God and not from God. This “submission” should not be seen as antithetical to a democratic freedom, which is a subject of cultural relativism. Through the emancipation of society from repression, social injustice and political totalitarianism, Islam has much to agree with the core of democracy. Democracy enabled many societies to ﬁnd the way toward

the elimination of political inequities, suppressions and persecutions, and totalitarian governments, where freedoms are respected. While the extreme secular and libertarian aspects in some Western democracies have been developed in certain historical and cultural contexts, the tension between religious and political values is still present. Cultural parameters, including the quantitative and qualitative power of collective religious aﬃliation, determine the deﬁnition and boundaries of freedom. As some democratic values in the West have been developed in terms of

overlap between secularism, liberalism and democracy, Muslim reservations are more related to some aspects of this overlap. The principal argument of those who conclusively claim that Islam and democracy are incompatible is based on issues related to Western concepts of political liberties. But even the proponents of an Islamic congruence with democracy exclude an “absolute” authority of individual and collective sovereignty in determining the idea of “common interest.” The Islamic view of the horizons and boundaries of human freedom is related to the concept of vicegerency (istikhla-f) on Earth. A human is free as a vicegerent of the Lord in this universe and not as the lord of this universe. In this view, religion is about the divine Truth, and revelation is about Guidance. Through the acceptance of revelation as a source of Truth and guidance, a “religious contract” is established and the tensions with a “social contract” are determined through the compatibility or not of the “religious” with some elements of human freedom. We can conclude that the real contradiction should not be seen as one between Islam and democracy, and less between Islam and the West or liberal democracy, but between religion and “excessive” liberalism and libertarianism. However, only through balanced and fair evaluation can the gap between any Islamic approach to democracy and some Western models be bridged. Western democracy is not only about excessive use of personal freedoms and allowance of anti-religious or Islamic moral values. Western liberal democracies managed to achieve equality among its citizens, a coherent system of social solidarity, equal chances in good education, healthcare, and distribution of wealth and care for the needy and the unemployed. Moreover, human rights in the West are not only related to rights that contradict Islamic rules. Consequently, the democratization of Muslim societies does not necessarily means their de-Islamization. The last section of this chapter discussed the contradictions and congruences

between democracy and the Islamic concept of shu-ra, which is celebrated in Muslim modern literature as a religious alternative and idealized model of democracy. As it emerges from the scriptural sources, shu-ra relates to the principles and general totalities/generic principles (kolliyya-t) in Islam, and was practiced in the highest political aﬀairs of the ummah. It was a general conceptual principle rather than a detailed systematized process in a speciﬁc framework. Although it did not stand for long in the Islamic classical Caliphate, it developed diachronically in modern Muslim political thought as a procedural mechanism and ethical consultative principle which has

signiﬁcant democratic implications. It implies a religious fundamental of political freedom and the right to express one’s free opinion on the governing authority, its election as well as its opposition. The unrestricted generic nature of the concept in Islam leaves the door open for human reasoning (ijtiha-d) to apply it in diﬀerent spatiotemporal contexts. I redeﬁned it in the political sense as “the general Islamic principle of collective participation of the members of society or their representatives in the procedure of free opinion exchange on all common issues, beyond the religious explicitly established rules in order to reach the best possible decisions.” The authority of the religious explicit rules makes a crucial diﬀerence between shu-ra and democracy. Thus, I had to focus on the concept of “democracy” in order to have a better image of its comparability with shu-ra. The deﬁnition of the term in Western political thought discloses a contested concept with no consensual conceptualization. The most feasible approach is to deﬁne it through some sine qua non key elements, or minima in Dahl’s contribution. I attempted to propose a deﬁnition of democracy that stresses its cultural viability and consolidation. In this deﬁnition democracy is “a polyarchical constitutional-based system of government which aims at the guarantee of the fundamental values of political equality, justice and freedom for its society members on the principles of citizenship, rule of law, human rights, separation of powers within a system of checks and balances and transparency, and most importantly can obtain consolidation through legitimacy among great majorities of the citizens and their regime utilizing the existing cultural values and norms.” The utilization of these values and norms means that the cultural margins of the democratic experience, which makes it a dynamic type and not a template model, are considered. Furthermore, it guarantees room for the Islamic political principles and values which are, including shu-ra, evolvable and adaptable to diﬀerent spatiotemporal contexts, and eliminate the motives for cultural protectiveness. As a religious principle, a shu-ra-based system cannot logically favor a

mechanism which would result in contradicting other Islamic principles. No Islamic “pure” system of shu-ra can claim that everything, including conclusive rules, for example, on h.ala-l and h.ara-m, is open to free suﬀrage of the people or its representatives. Seen as a crucial point of diﬀerence between Western secular applications of democracy and the Islamic shu-ra, this leads to an argument of inconsistency between a democratic and a shu-ra-based Muslim state for moral considerations. However, this argument raises questions about an essentialist view of democracy as Western, material or immoral. A democratic experience is not per se at odds with religious moral norms, as much as a shu-ra system is not per se a guarantee for Islamic moral values. Likewise, a democratic society is not essentially an immoral society if it does not “choose” to be as such. Between shu-ra and democracy there is a ﬂexible room in Muslim political thought to reconstruct classical jurisprudential ideas in light of three main factors: responding to the historical context; balance between common interests and religious objectives; and the distinction between “core democratic values” and “variable democratic cultures.”