ABSTRACT
The redundancy of rational morality that results from Muẓaffar’s analysis of independent rationality, firmly within the bounds of Murtaḍā Anṣārī’s school of Uṣūlī epistemology, seems to trivialise the very inclusion of independent rationality as a source of Sharīʿa precepts alongside the Qur’ān and the Sunna. Despite the fundamental position of an ʿAdliyya rational morality within Shīʿī theology and the acknowledgment of the theoretical role for rational morality as a source of Sharīʿa precepts in Shīʿī uṣūl al-fiqh, epistemic obstacles relating to what constitutes relevant judgements of rational morality and the conditions for their authoritativeness (ḥujjiyya) stop the actual impact of these ideas at the level of fiqh. Within the epistemological framework of Anṣārī, the criteria for the validity and authority of independent rationality act as obstacles to specific instances of rational morality playing a substantive role in the inference of Sharīʿa precepts. Although it is acknowledged that whenever something is just it is rationally praiseworthy, and whenever something is oppressive it is rationally blameworthy, inferences from these general principles to specific instances become problematic, rendering independent rationality effectively redundant. The emic approach with which this study set out demands that attempts be made to interpret Muẓaffar’s position on independent rationality as substantive and not trivial. An emic approach allows for a reading of uṣūl al-fiqh that can regulate a body of furū ͑al-fiqh that is consistent with the fundamental ʿAdliyya conception of a just and moral God. Accordingly, in Chapter 6 I revisited the conditions and epistemic criteria set out by Muẓaffar that seem to be preventing independent rationality from having a substantive role in the inference of Sharīʿa precepts. This analysis was with a view to demonstrating the space and resources inherent in Shīʿī legal theory that can allow for a reading of Sharīʿa more consistent with a theology that holds it impossible for precepts deemed rationally immoral to be attributed to God. Through examining Muẓaffar’s analysis of independent rationality as a source in uṣūl al-fiqh, three key criteria became apparent as obstacles to the role of rational morality. Potentially relevant judgements of rational morality were deemed as having to (1) result from unanimity of opinion, (2) be of rational issuance and (3) be certain (qaṭʿī) or definitive in their nature. Through a distinction
between rational and non-rational disagreement and by reading unanimity as a regulative criterion, it becomes clear that an individual mujtahid does not necessarily need to rely upon an almost unachievable absolute unanimity of opinion before considering judgements of rational morality to have potential Sharīʿa relevance. If an individual mujtahid considers that a judgement is rational in his view, whether all people agree to it or not, God ‘the Chief Rational Being’ would also judge in accordance with it, and such a judgement of reason would then be disclosive of a potentially relevant judgement of Sharīʿa for that mujtahid. Accepting the tenability of an individual mujtahid maintaining the validity of a judgement of rational morality in the face of rational disagreement does, however, raise the question of whether or not such disagreement may lead him to weaken his belief in the judgement of rational morality that he holds. This emphasises the necessity of examining the scope for reassessing the criterion of maintaining certainty (qaṭʿ) as the ultimate basis for authority of Sharīʿa sources in any attempts to allow for a more substantive role for rational morality in the actual inference of Sharīʿa precepts. Despite the fundamental place of the requirement for qaṭʿ as the ultimate basis for ḥujjiyya in the epistemological framework of the school of Anṣārī, prior Uṣūlī tradition embraced a system that culminated in the recognition of the unqualified authority of ẓann. This was an epistemological framework developed in the context of justifications for the authority of the isolated report, a textual source that by definition is less than certain in its transmission. Despite the concern with the isolated report, acceptance of the unqualified authoritativeness of ẓann is a position whose revival has huge scope for allowing a fuller role for independent rationality, for in theory it considers any probable source of Sharīʿa knowledge as potentially valid – be it textual or rational. The most important argument in Uṣūlī tradition for the unqualified authoritativeness of ẓann is referred to as dalīl al-insidād. The central premise refers to a phenomenological epistemic block to definitive knowledge of the majority of Sharīʿa aḥkām, with respect to both certainty-yielding sources of evidence, such as through explicit verses of the Qur’ān and tawātur ḥadīth, and certainly validated yet non-certain means, such as through the apparent meaning of the Qur’ān and isolated reports. Coupled with the other premises, this phenomenological epistemic block ultimately leads to a pragmatic necessity of relying upon noncertain ʿilm and establishes the authoritativeness of ẓann irrespective of its source. In such a framework a mujtahid cannot rely solely upon less-than-certain textual evidence and justifiably ignore judgements of rational morality, even if they are not entirely certain. If inferred judgements of rational morality, such as ‘An equal right to divorce is an instance of justice’ or ‘Undermining freedom of conscience in the choice of religion, by threat of death, is unjust’, are in apparent conflict with less-than-certain textual evidence, the mujtahid must seek to reconcile between the two forms of sources based upon the strength of the respective evidence. If the strength of the judgement of rational morality is deemed greater than the strength of the apparent indication of the texts, the rational judgement must be favoured in inferring the relevant Sharīʿa precept. In this way rational
morality can be a qualification to the valid interpretation of texts, preventing the attribution of immoral precepts to a just and moral God. The main obstacle to the efficacy of dalīl al-insidād in validating unqualified ẓann is the claim that there exists certain and definitive validation for specific sources of ẓann. I have argued in the preceding chapter that even the strongest of the justifications for the validity of specific sources of less-than-certain knowledge (ẓunūn khāṣṣa) cannot establish this claim absolutely. Examining the argument for the authority of the isolated report by way of rational convention, it was argued that the overly simplistic reading of the rational convention of relying upon isolated trusted sources of knowledge is problematic. Although there is a rational convention to rely upon isolated trusted sources for knowledge, despite the possibility that this information may be false and misconstrued, a problem seems to arise if this convention is seen as unqualified and unrestricted. It seems that rational agents only ordinarily rely upon the isolated report of a trusted source if they have no other sources of conflicting knowledge, and depending upon the importance of the matter at hand. A rational agent will not blindly follow isolated reports, even from trusted sources, when they have conflicting reasons suggesting that the report might be false, and will not uncritically follow non-certain isolated reports in cases of life and death. Thus, rational convention cannot establish the definitive and absolute authority of the trusted report, or apparent meaning, in an unqualified manner. The certainty that is an alleged criterion for the validity of judgements of rational morality is considered unattainable for the majority of aḥkām even through textual sources. In the context of a phenomenological epistemic block to definitive knowledge, both directly and through certainly validated means, all sources of probable opinion are potentially valid. In the case of conflicts, the strongest source of probable opinion becomes authoritative. Even if it is accepted that inferences from basic moral propositions, such as the claim that ‘An equal right to divorce is an instance of justice’ (and hence praiseworthy according to rationality and the Divine Legislator), are not certain, they are still a source of probable opinion arising out of a degree of inter-subjective agreement that cannot be ignored in the face of the apparent indication of a limited number of texts that might suggest otherwise. In cases of apparent conflict, the mujtahid must weigh up the strengths of the respective evidence, and if the judgement of rational morality is deemed stronger than the indication of the texts then he must issue his ruling in line with the judgement of rational morality, with the text either being reinterpreted accordingly or rejected entirely. In accordance with the convention of rational beings, this means that reliance upon isolated reports of trustworthy sources and the apparent meaning of textual evidence is still potentially authoritative, but only actually authoritative if there is no conflicting evidence of greater strength. Such a system would see judgements of independent rationality play a substantive role in the inference of Sharīʿa precepts and enable rational morality to actually be a condition for the validity of precepts attributed to a just and moral God.
