ABSTRACT

Qāʿidat al-taḥsīn wa al-taqbīḥ al-ʿaqlīyyain may be literally understood as the principle of the rational intelligibility of ‘good’ and ‘bad’. As will be seen in the subsequent analysis, what is intended here by ‘good’ and ‘bad’ (ḥusn and qubḥ), is quite specifically targeting the usage of the terms in relation to the moral status of voluntary actions. Broadly speaking, the principle asserts that the moral value of some actions – that is, their praiseworthiness or blameworthiness – can be understood by humans independent of revelation. It is this moral rationalism that provides the theoretical underpinning to the characteristic Shīʿī and Muʿtazilī doctrine of divine justice, by which they call themselves ʿAdliyya (the People of Justice), and it is upon the basis of this principle that Shī ͑ī scholars of uṣūl alfiqh claim that reason has a theoretical role as an independent source of Sharīʿa, leading to the category of al-dalīl al-ʿaqlī introduced in the previous chapter as al-mustaqillāt al-ʿaqliyya. Of course, all Muslim theologians ascribe justice to God, for al-ʿAdl is included amongst His Most Beautiful Names (His Asmā al-Ḥusnā). The contention between the ʿAdliyya and their interlocutors, in a debate that grew from one of the earliest disputes of Muslim theology, revolved around what the ascription of justice to God actually meant. The belief of the ʿAdliyya is that God is just in a substantive sense. This meant that God, His actions and His commands are just and that it is neither permissible (la yajūz) nor philosophically possible for God to act unjustly – where ‘just’ and ‘unjust’ are understood in a specific sense. What is crucial here is that the terms ‘just’ and ‘unjust’ are used as notions that are independently understandable by human beings, and not simply defined by revelation and divine command. To claim that God’s actions must be just in this sense required from the ʿAdliyya a prior affirmation that justice and injustice, or moral values per se, have some reality or truth independent of God’s command. Thus it was the discussions regarding the normative assessment of God’s actions that led to the formulation of the meta-ethical theory summed up by the principle of the intelligibility of the praiseworthy and the blameworthy. This principle has come to be described by contemporary Shī ͑ ī scholars as one of the ‘cornerstones’ of Shīʿī thought.1 The influence of this moral rationalism is felt across a number of disciplines, with it having particular significance in theology, ethics and fiqh.2 Although the central concern of this study may be

seen to be investigating the influence of this moral rationalism in the last of the aforementioned disciplines through the medium of uṣūl al-fiqh, the interdisciplinarity of the question means that the study cannot be solely jurisprudential. In order to properly set the ground for assessing the theological and ethical implications of the principle of the intelligibility of the praiseworthy and the blameworthy upon the understanding of Sharīʿa in modern Imāmī Shīʿī thought, we are thus first called to offer a thorough analysis of how this foundational principle itself has been conceived of and justified. This chapter will uncover the development and increasing depth of sophistication with which this principle has been dealt through the history of Imāmī thought. The primary purpose of this survey is to provide a conceptual prelude to the relevant debates in modern uṣūl al-fiqh, and thus it does not aim to be, nor need to be, comprehensive. In what follows, I examine a sample of key thinkers from what may be considered as three distinct periods in the intellectual history of the Imāmī Shī ͑a, all of which represent streams of thought with significant impact and influence upon the shape of debate in modern uṣūl al-fiqh. Although theological thought amongst the Shī ͑a can be traced back to the earliest companions of the Imāms, there is little doubt that it was the occultation of the Twelfth Imām that gave Imāmī thinkers an unprecedented impetus towards the development of systematic and comprehensive approaches to their scholarly endeavours.3 It thus seems appropriate to begin our analysis of the Shīʿī moral rationalism with a sample of how it was conceived of in this formative period. The second period of focus is what I term the ‘classical period’ of Imāmī theological thought, epitomised in the writings of ʿAllāma al-Ḥillī (d. 726/1325) and his teacher Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī (d. 672/1274). This classical period has been described ‘as the last school of original thought in Imamite kalām’4 representing a culmination of Imāmī theology, which had by then become infused with a distinctively philosophical approach. The continued centrality of the output from this period within the curricula of contemporary Imāmī schools of learning is testament to its ongoing influence, strongly supporting the assertion that Imāmī theology has experienced little substantive development since.5 However, there was a further important shift in the disposition of many Imāmī thinkers subsequent to this classical period. Although it is with Ḥillī that theology and philosophy became firmly fused together in Imāmī thought, and despite few significant changes in the substance of the Imāmī theological positions since, the dramatic developments in falsafa epitomised in the works of Ṣadr al-Dīn al-Shīrāzī (d. 1050/1640) have had a large influence upon how some have approached the doctrinal positions established in that classical period. Accordingly, the third section of this chapter will examine an analysis of the principle provided by Ḥājj Mullā Hādī al-Sabzawārī (d. 1290/1873), a scholar who combined his deep understanding of Ṣadrian thought with an arguably stronger mystical influence than Ṣadr himself, often applying his vast scholarly tools in service of a vigorous defence of Imāmī doctrines, including the qāʿidat al-taḥsīn wa al-taqbīḥ.