ABSTRACT
This chapter examines the William Hasker's reasons for rejecting classical theism. It examines Hasker's argument for thinking free will and timeless knowledge are compatible, and provides reasons for thinking that this argument is itself incompatible with the doctrine of eternity. In various publications, William Hasker has argued for what he calls "the openness of God." The chapter shows that considerations derived from the doctrine of eternity yield a more effective way to argue for the same conclusion. It describes those same considerations to try to undercut Hasker's conclusion that timeless knowledge could be of no use to God in guiding his actions in time. The relations between eternity and time therefore require a special sense of 'simultaneity.' Hasker begins the development of his position on God's timeless knowledge by examining a much discussed argument of Alvin Plantinga's which attempts to show that taking God's knowledge to be timeless does not solve the problem of foreknowledge and free will.
