ABSTRACT
This chapter summarizes both Tuggyism and Rhodanian articulations of open future open theism (OFOT). It argues that the way that philosophy of time drives OFOT is incompatible with contemporary systematic metaphysics. The chapter discusses a theological counter-example to OFOT that serves to demonstrate that even if a logically coherent systematic metaphysics could be developed to make sense of OFOT, such a metaphysics is not what has obtained in the actual world. It argues that the Peircean understanding of the semantic content of propositions concerning future contingents is correct. The chapter shows show how the metaphysics of modality required by Rhodanian OFOT entails that free agents possess power over the actual world, which allows Ockhamism to settle any tensions created by the dilemma of freedom and foreknowledge. It discusses Rhoda's understanding of the semantic force of the wording of propositions concerning future contingents in the light of both presentism and the correspondence theory of truth.
