ABSTRACT
Most philosophers believe there are human agents, and that these agents cause things (for a similar claim see Clarke 2013: 218). But relatively few philosophers call themselves ‘agent-causalists’ or say that they believe in ‘agent causation.’ Most, in fact, espouse what we might call ‘event-causal’ rather than ‘agent-causal’ views. And yet, they do not deny human agency. For example, Laura Ekstrom notes that “event-causal libertarians can believe that agents cause their free acts” (Ekstrom: this volume, page 64). As she puts it:
For instance, we commonly say such things as, “George freely ipped on the light switch.” Event-causal libertarians can maintain that we are perfectly sensible in making such claims, but they also maintain that in such cases we are speaking in shorthand: what we really believe or ought to believe is that certain events involving George (events of which George is the subject) brought about the switch ipping. These events include, for instance, George’s coming to desire light in the room and his forming the intention to ip the switch.
