ABSTRACT
One need only skim the other contributions to this volume to realize that philosophers are by no means agreed about whether or not we have free will or about what it is (or would be) if we do (or did) have it. Nor are philosophers by any means agreed about whether or not there is a God, or even about how best to conceive of the God, the existence of which they then disagree about. So it is unsurprising that what I shall have to say on the topic of divine free will is going to be controversial. However, within the classical theistic tradition at least, there is a consensus (that’s what makes it a tradition) that God, presuming He exists at all, should be understood as being essentially omnipotent, omniscient, perfectly good, and perfectly free. I shall be narrowing my focus to the philosophical puzzles surrounding how, within the constraints imposed by this tradition, these properties are best understood as relating to one another.
