ABSTRACT
On September 18, 1948, the day after Bernadotte’s assassination, Ernest Bevin, the British foreign secretary, referred to the Count’s plan as “Bernadotte’s monu ment.” In a message to the Amer icans, he asserted that it was necessary to take quick advantage of the “psychological moment” in the wake of the mediator’s murder. Hence, the plan should be published without delay for study by the Third UN General Assembly, which had convened on September 3. The Amer icans assented. The unexpected development put an end to the discussions that the two countries had been conducting since mid August regarding the best tactics for gaining approval of the plan. Now they agreed that after the details of Bernadotte’s plan were made public their representatives would announce that their countries supported it without reservations and viewed its adoption by the General Assembly not only as “a generally fair basis for settlement of the Pales tine question,” but also as an appropriate “memorial” for the Count, who had given his life on behalf of the UN.1 Bunche identified with this course of action and had great hopes for the “tremendous shock” that the world felt after the murder and for the Anglo Amer ican cooperation that would now reap its fruits.2 Israel found itself in a position that made it difficult to oppose Bernadotte’s plan or any other political resolution. Bunche’s secretary, Doreen Mashler, described the Israelis’ feeling after the murder as “almost as though someone had dropped the atomic bomb on them.” Bunche concluded that “Bernadotte’s murder had done the Jews more harm than Arabs could ever do.” World opinion, heretofore in their favor, would now turn against them.3 The UN published Bernadotte’s report on September 20. Two days later, the United States and Great Britain announced their support for it. Secretary of State Marshall called on the warring parties and the General Assembly to adopt the report in full without haggling over the details. Bevin seconded him, observing that the Bernadotte plan was a package deal and should be implemented in full as soon as possible.4 The Israeli government preferred to keep silent and let the Arabs be the first to reject the plan,5 and the latter soon delivered the goods. “The Arabs will fight to the last bullet” and obliterate the Bernadotte plan on the battlefield, Abd al-Rahman Azzam announced in Cairo. On September 21, he officially notified the UN of the Arab states’ rejection of the plan. Officials in the various Arab capitals hastened to express their reservations about the plan to
foreign envoys, while the Arab press competed as to who would denounce it most strenuously. Because it explicitly recognized Israel, the Arabs described it as even worse than the first Bernadotte plan.6 The Israeli government, which had begun to fear that its silence would be interpreted as acquiescence to the plan, issued a moderate statement on September 22, welcoming the acceptance of Israel as an independent state but rejecting the idea of detaching the Negev from it. It asked for more time so it could study the rest of the report.7 The truth, as soon became clear, was that the Israeli General Staff was drawing up plans for a rapid operation to gain control of the entire Negev, starting with its northern section. Bunche arrived in Paris on October 8. It gradually dawned on him that pushing the Bernadotte plan would be more complicated than he had thought. The Arabs were doing everything they could to forestall discussion of the plan, and their influence was increased by the fact that the venue was the General Assembly, rather than the Security Council. They managed to thwart the Anglo Amer ican proposal to make the Palestine issue the first item on the Assembly’s agenda. By persisting in their efforts to postpone the deliberations, they unwit tingly helped Israel prepare and carry out Operation Yoav, to seize the northern Negev, before the plan came up for discussion. Bunche, who defended the plan to the Arab representatives at the Assembly, thought it “a propitious moment for the Arabs” after the assassination. Looking back, three years later, he diagnosed the Arabs’ policy then as a political fiasco.8
