ABSTRACT
China’s growing strategic imprint – whether direct or indirect – has been increasingly tied to the security and stability of the Korean Peninsula, providing both opportunities and new challenges for the US-ROK alliance. On one hand, China’s geopolitical and economic rise coupled with its integration in the global community has given its diplomacy more leverage in managing tensions on the Korean Peninsula.1 Since 2003, Beijing has been more proactive in mitigating crises by providing a critical economic lifeline – energy and food aid – to North Korea, while attempting to contain Pyongyang’s nuclear ambitions. In this context, China’s three strategic objectives toward North Korea have been traditionally interpreted in terms of achieving (1) stability (no implosion, no regime change, and no war); (2) peace (diplomatic normalization between the US and North Korea), and (3) denuclearization/non-proliferation of WMD on the Korean Peninsula. Following North Korea’s third nuclear test on 12 February 2013 and subsequent escalating tensions and threats by Pyongyang to conduct ‘preemptive nuclear strikes’ on the US, China agreed with a new draft of UN Security Council sanctions and measures aimed to punish North Korea for its ongoing WMD and ballistic missile programs. At the same time, however, China affirmed its ‘consistent’ position: ‘peace over war, alleviation over tension, dialogue over confrontation’.2 Notwithstanding signs of increasing strains in Sino-North Korean relations coupled with growing internal debates in China on how to handle North Korea, China’s key strategic priority in preventing a major war on the Korean Peninsula has been interpreted in line with preventing a North Korean implosion. Such collapse would undermine China’s geostrategic interests by removing the traditional strategic buffer vis-à-vis the US provided by North Korea, and significantly increase the PLA’s military deployment requirements in northeast China. In this view, China cannot afford to cease its support, trade and aid to North Korea.3 Beijing has therefore prevented North Korea’s socio-economic implosion, while simultaneously exerting
pressure on Pyongyang to return to the stalled Six Party Talks and resolving North Korea’s nuclear issue through multilateral diplomatic channels.4
