ABSTRACT

The period following the release of the September 2005 Joint Statement witnessed a historical change in North-East Asian politics in general and North Korea’s bargaining with the USA in particular. This was due to the fact that between October 2005 and October 2006 Pyongyang’s foreign policy evolved from alignment with other powers in the region and participation in an international regime to isolation and an open and provocative display of its nuclear capability. The run-up to North Korea’s October 2006 nuclear test was marked by growing tensions between North Korea and its neighbours and in bilateral relations between the Kim Jong Il government and the Bush administration. These two sets of tension were in marked contrast to the improvement in relations that had characterized the April 2003-September 2005 period. Escalating tensions with North Korea were not the only foreign policy

challenge that the USA had to confront between late 2005 and late 2006. Washington’s problems in Afghanistan and Iraq increased. There was no end in sight to either of these two conflicts, and cracks appeared in the military coalitions on the ground in both countries. In addition, a major change occurred in the international system which had an indirect impact on the North Korean nuclear crisis when Washington became directly involved in resolving the Iranian nuclear issue. The election of hardliner Ahmadinejad to the presidency of Iran in mid-2005 led to a tougher stance from Tehran regarding its nuclear programme. Tensions thus increased, and on 4 February 2006 the IAEA referred Iran to the UN Security Council, which warranted Washington’s direct engagement.1 Finally, the USA joined the EU-3 in talks with Iran in June 2006 (Rice 2006b). Another significant development, affecting both the international system as

a whole and the North Korean nuclear conundrum more directly, took place in the second half of 2005. In August China hosted the USA for their first bilateral Senior Dialogue on security-related issues. This dialogue continued on a regular basis until the end of the Bush presidency, with five more rounds of bilateral talks taking place. It was complemented by a regular Strategic

Economic Dialogue at the Vice Premier/Secretary of the Treasury level held five times during the Bush administration. In sharp contrast to the Cold War, the two greatest powers of the early twenty-first century held regular talks at a very high level concerning a multitude of security and economic issues. Moreover, in September 2005 US Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick (2005) asked China to become a ‘responsible stakeholder’ in world affairs. During the same month, Hu started to advocate a ‘harmonious world’, after introducing this concept in a speech to the UN General Assembly. As a result of China’s new thinking and US requests, Beijing foreign policy changed. The Hu government became more actively involved in resolving the Iranian nuclear issue, and eventually joined the EU-3 talks with the USA and Russia. Meanwhile, Wang Guangya, the Chinese ambassador to the UN, played a key role in dealing with crises in Sudan and Somalia (Alden 2007: 116-17). Hu also helped to shift China’s approach to North Korea. Relations slowly

progressed from alignment and particular consideration for its neighbour to a more normal relationship, akin to China’s relations with the majority of other countries (Funabashi 2007: 277-8). This was reflected in Beijing’s decision to support US financial sanctions on Banco Delta Asia and in UN Security Council resolutions to impose sanctions on Pyongyang. As Taylor (2010: 45) suggests, from the onset of the second nuclear crisis China undeniably became more willing to support multilateral sanctions, and even discreetly to punish North Korea unilaterally. As we will see in this chapter, on several occasions Beijing treated Pyongyang as it would have any other country engaging in high-intensity brinkmanship. Inter-bureaucratic differences in the Bush administration continued

throughout this period. The hawks still sought to put pressure on the Kim Jong Il government. Financial pressure became their main tactic to undermine his regime. Four days before the signing of the September 2005 Joint Statement, the Treasury Department had designated the Macau-based bank Banco Delta Asia as a ‘primary money-laundering concern’ owing to its involvement in laundering money obtained by North Korea via illicit activities.2 Shortly afterwards, the USA imposed sanctions on North Korean companies by freezing their accounts in Banco Delta Asia. These sanctions had a fundamental influence on North Korea’s behaviour during the October 2005-October 2006 period.3 They were complemented by diplomatic pressure in the form of criticism of North Korea’s human rights record and, more importantly, multilateral UN Security Council sanctions. Meanwhile, the doves tried to regain the initiative in the inter-bureaucratic

bargaining process. However, the financial sanctions proved to be very damaging for North Korea and Pyongyang refused to return to the talks, which prevented discussion of the September 2005 Agreed Framework. Therefore, the doves’ position was weakened. Nonetheless, their preference for solving the crisis through dialogue did not disappear. To begin with, during this phase of the crisis Rice (2006c), Zoellick (2006) and Hill (2006a) called for the resumption of the Six-Party Talks. Furthermore, the doves drew a

Post-nuclear North Korea and the Bush

parallel between the cases of Libya and North Korea and suggested that the latter should follow a ‘Libyan model’ leading towards the eventual normalization of relations (Rice 2006a). US-Libya relations were improving at the time, with little indication that Washington would get involved in a North Atlantic Treaty Organization campaign supporting rebels fighting against the Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Gaddafi in 2011. In addition, the doves were successful in coaxing the USA to join talks aimed at halting the Iranian nuclear programme (Doyle 2008; Weisman 2006). They were later linked to both nuclear crises. The remarkable changes in the international system and in Washington’s

policy towards North Korea produced a dramatic shift in Pyongyang’s choice of bargaining tactics, as discussed above. Eventually the Kim Jong Il government resorted to brinkmanship but seemed unable to contemplate using any other tactic to try to re-engage the USA in bilateral negotiations. Pyongyang even used a nuclear test to emphasize the seriousness of its brinkmanship. Something similar happened during the Obama presidency, suggesting that Pyongyang attaches great importance to the possession of nuclear capability.

The normalization of bilateral diplomatic relations as a North Korean goal